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“EU membership is the most revolutionary process since the creation of autonomy 
in 1921”1 
     -Harry Jansson 
“The time that Ålandic politics could be limited exclusively to what is happening in 
Åland is gone”2 
     -Barbro Sundback 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Åland Islands with their population of nearly 30,000 people and 6,500 islands represent a 
unique deviation from the “one nation, one language” conceptualisation of the romantic nationalism 
of 19th century. This rests not only on the grounds of its unilingual Swedish speaking status in an 
overwhelmingly Finnish speaking state, but also on its demilitarised (from 1856) and neutralised 
(from 1921) status according to international law.3  
Once an integrated part of the Swedish realm, it was incorporated to the Russian empire alongside 
Finland in the treaty of Fredrikshamn in 1809 and as a result of the Crimean war became 
demilitarised in 1856 in a treaty between Russia, the UK and France4. Prior to the birth of the 
Finnish nation state in December 1917 “The Åland movement” considered re-joining the old 
mother land, Sweden as the only way to guarantee the islanders’ Swedish identity and security. As a 
response Finland hastily offered autonomy in May 1920 but this was rejected by the Åland 
Movement at time. The following year, the Åland question was brought before the League of 
Nations which decided on a compromise solution which would grant the Islanders further autonomy 
alongside neutralisation5 in exchange for Finnish sovereignty over the islands. 
 
1 Ålandstidningen 15 Novemeber 1994 
2 Sundback 2006, p.102 
3See Hannikainen and Horn eds. 1997 and Spiliopolou-Åkermark ed. 2011 for legal perspectives on the international 
legal order regarding the Åland Islands. 
4 See Ålandskulturstiflse for the full documents 
http://www.kulturstiftelsen.ax/images/internationellaavtal/engelskaavtal.pdf.  
5 This was done in a multi-lateral manner and was the primary concern on the Swedish side. see Barros 1968 
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Ålands autonomy act was revised in 1951 which introduced the concept of “hembygdsrätt” 
(regional citizenship) and again in 1991 which required Finland to seek the Ålandic parliament’s 
consent in order for international agreements to be considered valid also on the territory of Åland.6 
 Durin Finland’s accession process to the European Union it was recognised that the state would 
need to conduct negotiations in such way as to gain the confidence of both the Ålandic Parliament 
and the EU. After long negotiations, this resulted in the so-called “Åland protocol”7 on 22 Feburary 
1994 which was then added to the Finnish accession treaty and signed in the Korfu Summit on 24 
June 1994. 
The final stage of the Åland’s journey to the EU was between the Korfu Summit and the final 
decision to give consent to the application of Finnish EU membership on the territory of Åland on 2 
December 1994. This decision and the process proceeding it can be defined as first in the history of 
Ålandic autonomy as it was the first time the Ålandic parliament transferred a share of its powers to 
a supra national structure, the first time the tool of public referendum was used on the Islands and 
the first “foreign policy” decision only it was authorised to take. This thesis aims to put this 
decision in its historical context with special focus on the internal political cleavages that have 
developed over the decades of autonomy on Åland. 
1.1 Research Questions 
 
Against this background, this thesis sets out to answer the following question. 
-How did the members of parliament of Åland discuss the topic of EU membership during the 
ratification process? 
Additionally, this thesis also asks the following supporting questions. 
-How did the political parties on Åland converge and diverge on the EU membership during the 
ratification process? 
-How did the historical cleavages play a role in the EU debates on Åland? 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
 
 
6 Autonomy Act 1991, Chapter 59 
7  See Fagerlund 1997. 
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Through the research questions stated above, this thesis aims to deepen the understanding of how 
the world’s “first autonomy in the modern sense”8 willingly transferred a share of its legislative 
power to a supra national structure, the European Union. By analysing the parliamentary debates 
during the ratification period of the EU membership application, the thesis aims to analyse the 
justifications of the decision to join and contribute to the studies of paradiplomacy9, which is a 
growing field in autonomy studies. 
The criticism towards “methodological nationalism” within Political Science has been driving force 
for studies of sub state entities. Methodological nationalism has been defined as the tendency to 
view the nation-state as  the primary unit of analysis in Political Science and International Relations 
at the cost of sub state units who are no less affected by global developments.10 This approach is 
also evident in studies of the Nordic region’s11 relations to the EU, the main premises of the 
research usually only incorporates nation states’ perspective and sometimes excludes Iceland when 
deemed necessary.12 
This thesis aims to contribute to against “methodological nationalism” by providing Ålandic 
perspectives to the topic of EU membership. It must also be remembered that by rescaling the unit 
of analysis to the sub state unit the intention is not to homogenise “Åland” into a monolithic actor 
as several studies tend to do but to also highlight the divergence of understandings of the EU within 
its own context. 
1.3 Relevance of the Research 
 
The studies regarding the interaction of autonomy systems with the wider world have been 
dominated by larger stateless nations and regions within federal states.13 In the Nordic context, due 
to the expansion of “foreign policy” capacities of Greenland and Faroe Islands with the most recent 
Home Rule act of 2005, a burgeoning literature on the topic may be observed.14 However, Åland 
seems to be lacking behind both in the Nordic context and in the broader field of “sub state 
diplomacy”.  The reasons for this lack are manifold but some probable causes will be proposed. One 
 
8 Benedikter 2009, p.10 
9 This concept can be simply defined as the interaction of sub state units with foreign governments and entities. More 
about the concept below 
10 See Wimmer and Schiller 2002, Jeffrey and Wilcott 2010. 
11 This is understood to the five nation states of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden plus the three 
autonomous regions of Faeroe Islands, Greenland and the Åland Islands. 
12For example, Hansen and Waever 2002 omit Iceland and the three autonomous regions in their analysis about 
national identity and the Nordic region in relation to the EU. 
13 See Keating and McGarry 2001, Keating and McGarry 2006, Gagnon and Keating 2012. 
14 See Bartmann 2006,Maria Ackren 2014 and 2018.  
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reason is the sheer smallness of Åland (with approx. 30 000 population) in comparison with larger 
regions such as Catalonia (with approx. 7.5 million in population) or Scotland (with approx. 5.4 
million in population). Similarly considering the recent developments regarding the 2014 Scottish 
and the 2017 Catalan referendums, the situation on Åland can be perceived as relatively uneventful 
from a global perspective. One other factor could be the broader sense of ethnicity on Åland whose 
official language is also an official language in Sweden and Finland softens the identity-based 
antagonism between the region and the state, at least to some degree. 
Åland itself has been subject of several studies from the perspective of international law15, and 
conflict resolution.16 Studies regarding the internal dynamics of Åland have been so far been few 
and far apart. These studies have focused on the development of the party system17, voter 
participation18, classification of the party system19, immigrant integration and nationalism20, 
development of secessionist parties in the Nordic region21 and intergovernmental relations.22 
More specifically, studies regarding the Åland islands and the European Union have 
overwhelmingly focused on the consequences of the membership for the islands.23  
During the writing of this thesis the Åland Islands Peace Institute has been commissioned by the 
Government of Åland to prepare a report on the 25 years of EU membership.24 This thesis positions 
itself as complementary to this research agenda with the intent of bringing forward, the often 
forgotten, deliberative process in which Åland took the decision in joining the Union when an 
exclusion was well within the realm of the possible.  
1.4 The Structure of the Thesis 
 
Following the introductory chapter this thesis will provide the theoretical framework in which the 
thesis will build upon in Chapter 2. This will focus on studies on sub state units and their “foreign 
affairs” which has been conceptualised with the term Paradiplomacy. Furthermore, this section will 
explain the method which will be used for analysis and its justification. The final subsection 
 
15For example Hannikainen 1993, Fagerlund 1997, Jääskinen 2005, Sliverström 2013, Suksi 2011 and Stephan 2017. 
16 See Spiliopoulou Åkermark 2011. 
17 See Wrede 1976. 
18 See Wrede 1981. 
19 See Söderlund 2008. 
20 See Jansson 2018. 
21 See Ackren and Lindström 2012. 
22 See Eve Hepburn 2014. 
23 For example Hannikainen 1997,Tiilikainen 2002 and Ekman 2006. 
24 https://mailchi.mp/fdd627d32682/land-islands-peace-institute-lands-fredsinstitut-newsletter-nyhetsbrev-4063521 
5 
 
explains the data selected for analysis. Chapter 3 will give a historical oversight on the development 
of the Ålandic autonomy and the development of political cleavages until the membership of the 
European Union. This section will aim to describe the cleavages in Ålandic politics that would later 
play a role in the EU debates. Chapter 4 will summarise the events that led up to the referendum 
process. Chapter 5 will include the analysis of the debates and will aim to analyse the themes and 
genres regarding the decision on EU membership in the Ålandic parliament. Chapter 6 will provide 
a discussion regarding the findings and Chapter 7 will conclude the thesis by highlighting further 
possible areas of research in this area. 
2. Theory, Method and Data 
 
2.1 International Relations Theory and Constructivism 
 
Diplomacy and foreign policy have traditionally been perceived as strict matter of the nation state 
units. Furthermore, traditional foreign policy analysis has conceptualised foreign policy via a 
distinction between “high politics” (i.e. diplomacy, defence policy and national security) and “low 
politics” (i.e. cultural policy, municipal affairs).25  
The main traditions of the study of International Relations which have been understood to have 
progressively developed over the end of the First World War primarily focused on inter-state 
relations which in turn reinforced the idea that the nation-state is the default unit of analysis in 
global politics, reinforcing the practice of methodological nationalism.26  
The realist approach has drawn its philosophical underpinnings from a Hobbesian interpretation of 
global affairs which understands the interaction of states as a “state of nature” in which states act 
upon self-interest and are by definition in conflict with other states who are naturally seeking their 
own self-interest.27 
In contrast to the realist approach, the Liberal approach to global affairs emphasises the 
interconnectedness and the possibility of states to overcome the anarchy of “the state of nature” 
through global cooperation.28 This approach has its roots in “social contract theory” which is based 
 
25 Michelmann 2009, p.1 
26 Brown and Ainsley 2005, p.19 
27 See Morgenthau 1978 and Carr 2001.  
28 See Moravscik 1997 
6 
 
on an understanding of society as a hypothetical contractual relationship between individuals who 
come together for mutual benefit and establish “society”.29 
After the failure of the two main approaches and their “neo” off springs to predict the end of the 
Cold War, the Constructivist approach brought a new take on global affairs by bringing an 
interpretive perspective. This approach draws from the post structuralism mode of thought within 
social sciences and humanities and focuses on the discursive aspect of global politics. Instead of 
theorising about the inherent nature of global affairs, they emphasize the discursivity of politics 
which is “social constructed”. In other words, “anarchy is what states make of it”.30 This approach 
is most noted for incorporating the effects of identity into the actions of states and international 
actors.31 
 The theoretical approach of this thesis will be based on the Constructivist approach in International 
Relations studies. Originally coined by Nicholas Onuf, this term and its followers has functioned 
from a broadly interpretivist standpoint in contrast with Realist and Liberal accounts of 
International Relations that focus heavily on states and non-states actors with objective aims.32  
 The overall characteristics of this approach can be summarised with three main propositions; 1- 
Social interaction is affected by ideational factors and not only material ones. 2-The most important 
ideational factors are “intersubjective” beliefs that cannot be reduced to the level of the individual 
and 3- these beliefs construct the actors’ identity and interests.33In the words of Finnemore 
“interests are not just out there waiting to be discovered, but are constructed through social 
interaction”34 
Notable constructivist Alexander Wendt in his seminal work Social Theory of International Politics 
states that constructivism does not provide a theory of international politics but rather that 
“constructivist sensibilities” encourage the researcher to analyse how social actors on an 
international field are constructed but say nothing in regards to which actor to study and where they 
are socially constructed35. He further advises the constructivist to choose the “units” and “levels” of 
analyses and the “structures” in which they operate in.36  
 
29 Brown and Ainsley 2005, p.23 
30 Wendt. 1992, p.395. 
31 See Howarth and Torfing 2005 
32 See Onuf 1989 
33 Finnemore and Sikkink 2001. pp. 392-393. 
34 Finnemore 1996, p.2 
35 Wendt 1999 p.7 
36 Ibid. 
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To use Kari Palonen’s 4-fold conceptualisation regarding the dimensions of politics will be 
beneficial in contextualisation of the “units” and the “structures” selected for this thesis.37 He 
defines the 4 dimensions as the following.  
Polity as the institutional framework of an established political system.38 
Policy which refers to the outputs as a result of the political process.39  
Politicking as the performative aspect (e.g. speeches) of politics, the essence of viewing “politics as 
action”40 
Politicisation as the process or act which turns an issue into a political issue41  
The utilisation of this framework is justified on the grounds that it is beneficial to distinguish the 
political context of Åland and highlight the separate party system operating in the polity of Åland. 
This framework also contributes to highlight that the policy of the decision on EU membership was 
dependent on the action of the politicians in operating in this context and to emphasize how they 
discussed this policy via politicking. The time frame of the politicisation is chosen on basis that 
until the European Council summit in Korfu, the process contained an European dimension which 
required the content of the EU member states and EU instiutions, however after the granting of 
consent to the Finnish accession treaty, the EU process became an internal political process on 
Åland, which will be the focus of this thesis. 
Utilizing this framework, the overall context of the subject matter of this thesis can be summarized 
as: 
Polity: The autonomous region of Åland 
Policy: Final decision on EU membership 
Politicking: Discourse on Ålandic EU membership by members of the Åland Parliament 
Politicisation: The signing of the Finnish accession treaty in Korfu on 24 June 1994 and the 
following referendum process. 
 
37 Kari Palonen 2003, p.171 
38 ibid  
39 Ibid  
40 ibid 
41 Ibid. 
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2.2. The Concept of Paradiplomacy 
 
By nature of the chosen topic, this thesis departs from the traditional understanding of Foreign 
Policy strictly a concern for the sovereign nation state42. In practice, several occasions of sub state 
units have developed their own foreign policy agenda that may differ from the central state that they 
are connected to. The practical application of this situation may include (but is not limited to) 
conducting trade agreements with sovereign states and other regions, establishing representative 
offices abroad and having a strong role (which may include an opt-out option) in the national 
preparation in international agreements.  
The chosen framework to analyse this external policy decision of Åland to join the European Union 
is Paradiplomacy. Phonetically similar to paramedic and paramilitary this concept also deals with a 
parallel occurrence, that of foreign policy. The aim of the utilisation of this conceptual tool is to 
place this research project in a wider academic context while also being wary of the potential 
insularity of case-study research conducted by qualitative methods. A brief overview of the concept 
and its corresponding research agenda will be provided below. 
The concept of Paradiplomacy has its etymological roots in the words “parallel” and “diplomacy”. 
The implication being that it constitutes something else than what is traditionally accepted as 
diplomacy and occurs simultaneously. In studies regarding autonomous regions and stateless 
nations “Paradiplomacy” has been used as a synonym to several concepts including “Sub state 
diplomacy”, “Regional diplomacy”, “Micro diplomacy” and so on.43 This situation has led the 
concept to be described as a “political buzz word with mysterious successes in specialized 
literature, even though their analytical definition is not clear”.44 
Paradiplomacy’s first known instance of usage is within British diplomatic historian Rohan Butler. 
In his work titled Studies in Diplomatic and Historiography published in 1961. He dedicates a 
separate chapter to “paradiplomacy” which he considers to be:  
“The highest level of personal and parallel diplomacy, complement or competing with the regular 
foreign policy of the minister concerned, is thus a recurrent temptation to the head of the executive, 
be he a primer or president, dictator or monarchy”45. 
 
42 Morin and Paquin 2018, p.7 
43 Kuznetsov 2014, p.25. 
44 Aguirre 1999, p.185. 
45 Quoted in Kuznetsov 2014, p.26. 
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As noted by Kuznetsov, this definition has been criticised and has never seriously considered by 
later political scientists who take the agency of autonomous regional units and their political 
systems to be main unit of analysis.46 
The foreign policies of regional units have been a growing field of study from the 1970’s onwards. 
However, these studies primarily had a North American perspective and anchored its research 
agenda on case study research on US states and Canadian provinces.47 It was in 1984 when the 
concept of paradiplomacy was rearticulated by Duschaeck within a proposed explanatory 
framework.  He originally preferred the term “micro-diplomacy”, a form of diplomacy which 
according to him resulted in two different forms of paradiplomacy; transborder regional regimes 
(which are understood to be informal contacts with the surrounding environment) and global micro-
diplomacy which is the interaction of constituent governments into relation with other national and 
constituent governments.48 
Duschacek later shifted his conceptual preference to wholly embrace Panayotis’ usage of the term 
Paradiplomacy, albeit with the same content, on the grounds that: “Not only has it no derogatory 
sound, but 'para' expresses accurately what it is about: activities parallel to, often co-ordinated with, 
complementary to, and sometimes in conflict with centre-to-centre 'micro-diplomacy”49.  
Although the content of the term remained the same, it must be noted that Paradiplomacy has since 
gained a much wider acceptance in the field of regional research in relation to “micro-diplomacy”. 
The concept made another return to the field of political science during the 1990’s. The post-Cold 
war period had opened a new page in Europe, with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the discourse on 
“Europe of the Regions”50. According to this paradigm the “stateless nations” of Europe now had 
the chance to exert influence in global affairs as national borders were rapidly losing significance 
and the border between “internal” and “external” policy was on its way to become irrelevant. This 
perspective has been sometimes been described as “New Regionalism” which viewed the future of 
autonomous regions, not as nation states-to be but rather as a part of the “post-national” and 
interconnect world which was embodied in the newly transformed European Union. The Committee 
of Regions (CoR) was especially pointed out as a potential forum for paradiplomatic activities 
together with an emphasis on the “subsidiarity principle” in the Maastricht treaty.51This idea was 
 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Duschacek 1984, p.5  
49 Duschacek 2001, P.32, Note 1. 
50 Keating 2013, p.193 
51 Keating 1998 pp.161-183. 
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also prevalent in the context of Åland where the EU was considered to increase Ålands room for 
manoeuvre against the Finnish state, at least by proponents of  EU membership. 
By penetrating the traditional borders of the nation-state, this process of rapid integration in 
Western Europe has on one hand opened up the traditionally isolated markets of autonomous 
regions to international competition but on the other hand also offers new possibilities to access 
new firms and production methods which can help formulate new policies according to the new 
socio-economic realities.52 
It is no accident that it was within this decade that saw the founding of a research journal titled 
Regional and Federal Studies53. Furthermore, a special edition of the journal published in 1999 was 
dedicated specifically to Paradiplomacy as was latter gathered into a book titled Paradiplomacy in 
Action: Subnational Governments edited by Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating.  
In this volume, Michael Keating argues for three main factors which drives regions to seek action 
on the international field; Economic, Cultural and Political.54 
On the economic front he argues that regions attempt to seek new markets for their industries, 
foreign investment and technology for modernisation and promote tourism opportunities in an ever-
mobile global economy. 
On the cultural front Keating argues that regions have attempted to expand their contact with 
countries and regions of a similar cultural background (e.g. Quebec and the Francophonie) or 
collaborate with other minority regions (e.g. European Bureau for Lesser used Languages). 
Finally, on the political front Keating claims that regions that view themselves as separate national 
project may use the international arena to legitimize their separate national or regional identity by 
appearing on the world scale as an actor of itself.  All three of these factors will be crucial to the 
analysis of why Åland chose to join the union. 
Another proposed alternative to “paradiplomacy” has been the concept of “constituent 
diplomacy”.55 However, this term has a unique emphasis on federalism and term “constituent” does 
not correspond well with autonomous regions within otherwise unitary states. For example it would 
be somewhat of a stretch to claim that Åland is a “constituent state” of the Republic of Finland 
 
52 Soldatos and Michelmann 1992, p.134 
53 Kuznetsov 2014, p.39 
54 Keating 1999, pp.4-5 
55 Michelmann 2009 p.7 
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especially with consideration that Ålandic laws are not considered to be in a hierarchical 
relationship with the laws that are passed by the Parliament of Finland.56  
A more contemporary definition of “paradiplomacy” has been put forward by Kuznetsov as: 
 “a form of political communication for reaching economic, cultural, political, or any other types of 
benefits, the core of which consists in self- sustained actions of regional governments with foreign 
governmental and non- governmental actors.”57 
The adoption of this definition is justified on the ground that such a definition is broad enough to 
included regions belonging to both unitary and federal states without invoking a larger discussion 
on de jure and de facto legal status of regions with some degree legislative powers. However, one 
conceptual adjustment is deemed necessary. Instead of “regional government” it will be argued that 
“regional polity” would be a more accurate definition for the unit of analysis as regional 
parliaments may have the capacity to play a significant role in formulating or approving the 
regional government’s foreign policy initiatives. Additionally, the parliament may be the sole 
authority in appointing delegates to forums of international and regional cooperation such as the 
Nordic Council and the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference. This is particularly important in the 
context of Åland where two thirds (20/30) majority was required to confirm the validity of the 
Finnish EU accession treaty on the territory of Åland. Furthermore, the scarce majority in favour 
(51.9) of membership in the state-wide referendum also indicates deep division within the 
population and governing political parties as well. 
 In conclusion, the units of analysis, which form the basis of paradiplomatic research have enough 
commonality with each other in terms of being governmental organs with administrative and 
legislative authority that makes them “more than a city and less than a state”58.  
In light of the chosen research framework, it will be argued that the decision of the Ålandic 
Parliament to join the European Union on 2 December 1994 falls into this definition of 
paradiplomacy and that it constitutes the most important foreign policy decision made in the history 
of Ålands autonomy so far. The primary aim of this thesis is to put the Ålandic decision to join the 
EU in its historical context. 
 
 
56 See Suksi 2005 for a legal analysis of the legal arrangement regarding Åland. 
57 Kuznetsov 2014 p.34 
58 Cornago 2010 p.14 
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2.3 Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
Discourse Analysis as method entails a variety of different approaches to the analysis of that can 
vary within itself.59 When applying Discourse Analysis in the field of Political Science one 
inevitably begins with the pre-arrangement of the narrative, namely the ontology of politics. This is 
to ask the question of “what is politics?” and “what is the political?” with the intent of grasping the 
context in which the narrative is arranged in. 
While it would be vastly beyond this thesis’s scope to go into a detailed discussion of perennial 
debate of the ontology of politics within political philosophy and political science, it is nevertheless 
necessary to clarify the working framework of the thesis.  
Wiesner et. al states that certain common elements of methodology and ontology among discourse 
analysts are as follows: 
-Language is social practice and should be analysed as such. 
-A discourse is a set of practices that create meaning and are distinguishable depending on its 
context 
-Discourse is a way of creating and circulating world views and ideologies. 
-Discourse is not random but occurs in a structured form.60 
The discursive and constitutive conceptualisation of language has been conceptually defined as 
“Speech Acts” by philosopher J. L. Austin in his work How to do things with words and was 
elaborated on by John Searle.61 The main importance of this theory is to express the power of 
linguistic constructions on the human experience. From this point of departure both the discussion 
on EU membership and the decision to join are “speech acts” which create new political realities.  
When it comes to interpretive methodology and the discipline of International Relations, as a part of 
the constructivist approach Iver Neumann discusses the larger “linguistic turn” in social sciences 
and notes that for International relations studies, analysing linguistic patterns doesn’t simply mean a 
focus on narrative discourse and rhetoric but to how politics are affected by the construction and 
 
59 Wiesner et.al 2017, p.68 
60 Ibid. 
61 See Austin 1962 and Searle 2011. 
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utilisation of such discursive acts.62In other words Neumann invites the researcher to attempt to 
understand how political actors “do foreign policy with words”. 
From a similar perspective, Ole Waever proposes to combine discourse analysis with foreign policy 
studies on the premise that the analysis of discourses can in fact enlighten and explain foreign 
policy decisions.63 He notes that while not every specific policy can be explained via Discourse 
Analysis, for general overarching issues such as European Union membership, it can provide an 
explanatory framework for the adopted policy.64  
This is done via analysing the conceptual use and change of identity based terms such as “nation”, 
“state” interact with each other and with concept of “Europe” which in turn affects the discursive 
logic behind an actor’s positioning on the European Union. 
Waever considers foreign policy discourse as a “public logic” which limits the political action of 
the actors involved as it has intimate connections with “core concepts” such as “state” and 
“nation”.65 This according to him, replaces the idea of political speech as unsystematic but rather 
that political argumentation is in fact structured by the basic conceptual logic found in a society 
which in turn designates the field of discussion for the following political struggles.66 
2.4 The Layered Framework of Analysis 
 
In light of this methodological background, this thesis adopts Waver’s “three-layered framework” 
to utilise within the national debates regarding the European Union.67 While Åland is not a state or 
nation in the classical sense this framework is useful for its previous applications on the Nordic 
referendums which took place in the same time frame as this thesis68 and its post positivist ontology 
allows for conceptual flexibility needed for its adaption for an autonomous region. 
On Level 1 he proposes an analysis of the relationship between the concepts of the “nation” and the 
“state”.  
 
62 I. Neumann 2002, p. 628. 
63 Waever 2002 pp.26-33. 
64Ibid. 
65 ibid 
66 Ibid. 
67 He emphasizes that the layers are not 3 levels of separate discourse but rather that a discourse exists 
simultaneously on three interconnected discursive planes which affect each other.  
68 See Hansen and Waever 2002. 
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This has traditionally been done vis-a-vis the two ideal types of Civic Nationalism and Ethnic 
Nationalism.69 Civic Nationalism emphasises the community of belonging based on political 
loyalties towards state institutions and Ethnic Nationalism emphasizes the “natural” qualities of a 
community such as culture, language and traditions which can only be accessed upon birth.70  
Civic nationalism has constantly been associated with the French republican form of citizenship and 
a fusion of the “nation” and the “state”. Ethnic nationalism on the other hand has been associated 
with the German cultural nationalism which presupposes a distinction between the “nation” and the 
“state”.71 
On level 2 this construction of state and nation is put in a relational interaction with the concept of 
“Europe” which in turn gains meaning through the lenses of the “nation” and the “state”. On this 
level, the key question is how the nation and the state are articulated through the concept of Europe? 
Furthermore, what does the concept of Europe mean for nation and the state? Does it constitute a 
threat or an opportunity for the nation and state? The basic presumption is that the construction of 
nation and state have a primary role in answering these questions. 
On level 3 the discourses of the prior two levels take a concrete form through articulation of specific 
European Policy. This is usually done by political parties or other political actors when they argue 
in favour of or against EU membership and explain their rational for it. Waver argues that this is 
level that a researcher should begin working towards his or her analysis as the actors construct a 
European Policy based on their conceptualisation of the idea of Europe on level 2 in relation to their 
understanding of the state and nation on level 1.72 
There are certain advantages and disadvantages of adopting such a framework. The most obvious 
problem with adopting this framework in the context of the Ålandic EU debate is the immediate 
problem of “nationhood”. From the perspective of international law, the Ålanders do not constitute 
a “nation” as such and the institutions of autonomy are not considered to be a “state”.  
Additionally, the fact that Swedish is an official language in both Sweden and in Finland broadens 
the Ålandic sense of ethnicity in a way that does not necessarily conform to the idea of a nation-
state, nor that of diaspora nation. 
 
69 See Özkirimli 2010. 
70 Kymlicka 2001, p.243  
71 Waever 2002, pp.34-35 
72 ibid. 
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However, the choice of a post-structural methodology can be viewed a potential way around this 
conceptual dilemma. By focusing on the uses of the term “nation” and “state”, it aims avoid the 
conceptual rigidity can could potentially arise in analysis. The goal here will be to seek for potential 
substitute terms within to fit the regional context yet serve the same political purpose within the 
Ålandic EU debate. 
 Two possible candidates in this context are the terms “the people” and “autonomy”.  The first step 
is to substitute the term “nation” with the term “the people”73, which has a similar conceptual use in 
the rest of the Nordic region, and secondly to substitute the “state” with the concept of 
“autonomy”74 as the political unit “the people” are in relation with. This is not to claim that the 
concepts are synonyms to “nation” and “state” per se but serve an identical function within the 
context of Foreign Policy and the debates regarding the membership of the European Union on 
Åland. 
This framework is also beneficial for the analyses of national identities visa vie Europe which in its 
turn necessitates a “lounge durée” approach to shed light on the historical developments in the  
cultural, social and political spheres which have influenced the way in which the ideas of 
“autonomy” and “the people” have been utilized in.     
2.5 Data 
 
This thesis primarily utilises 7 parliamentary debates manually collected and printed out of the 
archive of the Parliament of Åland (Lagtinget). This corresponds to roughly 300 pages of debate 
dedicated to EU membership and its consequences.  
The analysed period is between the Korfu Summit between 24 June 1994 and the ratification of EU 
membership by the Parliament of Åland on 2 December 1994. This timeline is chosen to emphasize 
the internal political process on Åland. Prior to the Korfu Summit, the EU or a member state could 
withdraw from the process essentially ending the EU’s expansion in 1995. The approval of the 
Finnish membership treaty in Korfu “put the ball in Finland and Åland’s court”. 2 December 1994 
is date that the Regional Parliament gave its consent to membership, which guaranteed membership 
from 1 January 1994. This is not to claim that the EU process for Åland started from the Korfu 
 
73 Folket in Swedish 
74 Självstyrelsen in Swedish 
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summit but to contextualise the referendum process that led to the political decision in favour of EU 
membership for Åland. 
Due to the working schedule of the Parliament of Åland, the month of October is considered a break 
period between parliamentary sessions and the new legislative year begins on the first week of 
November. Therefore, the first three debates which are included in the analysis are actually 
considered to be a part of the final session of the 1993-1994 parliamentary session while the debates 
which take place after October are considered to be a part of the 1994-1995 parliamentary session. 
The debates held on EU membership and its consequences during the ratification process took place 
on the following dates; 
-14 September 1994 
-21 September 1994 
-26 September 1994 
-11 November 1994 
-17 November 1994 
-28 November 1994 
-2 December 1994 
Considering the lack of academic research on the topic and the absence of parliament during the 
month of October, this thesis also utilizes newspaper articles from both Ålandstidningen and Nya 
Åland from 16 June 199475 until 2 December 1994. These were collected from the digital archive of 
the National Library of Finland in Helsinki. The intention of this is to further explore the context in 
which the debates took place in. 
This thesis argues that by utilizing the parliamentary debates and the public statements of Ålandic 
politicians, it will be possible to sufficiently describe and analyse the context in which the Åland 
Islands joined the European Union. The analysis of these debates aims to contribute to the 
understanding of the EU from the perspective of an autonomous region in which Åland is the 
designated case study. 
2.6 Conceptual and Methodological Considerations 
 
 
75 It was on this date on which the Parliament of Åland decided to hold a separate referendum on the islands. 
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As the entirety of data is in Swedish language, translation is an essential part of the research design. 
This also brings with it a need for caution when adopting certain concepts to English. Most 
problematic is the Swedish term “riket” which roughly translates to “the kingdom” or “the realm” in 
English but is used in two separate ways in Swedish. In the context of Åland “riket” refers to the 
state, in this case being Finland. However, this term also appears in demonym “rikssvenskar” 
(literally, “swedes of the realm”) which was a term coined to distinguish the Finland Swedish 
community from Swedes in Sweden. The issue with this term is that “rike” does not refer to Finland 
but rather to Sweden. While this is culturally and politically self-evident in the Swedish speaking 
social sphere, an English translation needs to avoid confusion. The choice made in this thesis is to 
avoid a literal translation of “riket” and to use the referred country in the relevant text. This means 
that “Finland” instead of “realm” or “state” will be preferred in order prevent confusion. Similarly, 
when joint terms such as “riksmyndigheterna” (state authorities) or “rikspartierna” (state parties) 
appear in the data the preferred translation will be Finnish authorities and Finnish parties 
respectively. This is to make clear which “rike” is in question. Furthermore “riksvensk” will be 
translated simply as “Swedish”, in conformity with standard English customs. Similarly concepts 
such as Landstinget/Lagtinget, Landskapsstyrelsen and Lantrådet will be translated into English 
based on their functions within the political system which would be Regional Parliament, Regional 
Government and Premier respectively. 
Another potentially limiting aspect of the research design comes from the elite driven nature of the 
data chosen. Methodologically discourse analysis is not equipped with the tools to measure the 
grassroots understandings of the EU. This is due to its dependency on publicly available documents 
such as newspaper articles and parliamentary debates. This dependency gives primacy to the 
argumentation of the political elite. Therefore, this research project does not aim to survey voter 
attitudes or to explain why the referendum results came out in the way they did. Rather this project 
aims to analyse the linguistic structures in which European Integration was discussed. These 
structures are constructed by the leading political actors that usually represent broader interest 
groups in society.76  
It is also unrealistic to expect that a researcher will be able to present every small detail of every 
debate regarding the European Union and Åland. This project is aware of this practical limitation 
and focuses strictly on parliamentary speeches given by MPs. It will omit all “reply” sessions in the 
chamber, not on the basis of their worthlessness but on the understanding that they are 
 
76 Waever 2002, p.42  
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supplementary data which are not constitutive of the premises of the debate but rather supplements 
to it.     
On these premises, the thesis will attempt to construct a system of discursive structures regarding 
the debate on the Ålandic decision to join the European Union. 
3. Historical Background  
 
The international status of Åland, as it is so often framed within Ålandic discourse, rests on the 
“holy trinity” of Åland’s constitutional status, autonomy and the demilitarised status of the 
islands.77 The dominant interpretation on Åland regarding these three legal orders and their 
implications formulate an indivisible whole in which one component cannot be separated from the 
other two which make up the whole. This was especially prominent during the EU process in which 
the Finnish government had a much narrower interpretation of the legal order regarding Åland. The 
Finnish government’s interpretation rested on the assumption that demilitarisation and 
neutralisation were not legally connected to the autonomy arrangement.78  
Despite its small geographic area and minuscule population, the Åland Islands have managed to 
punch above their weight by using their “nuisance power” in adjusting to the geopolitical realities 
on a European and global scale, through adopting a unique interpretation on the neutralisation and 
demilitarisation treaties and through formulating a parallel negotiation process regarding 
membership of the European Union to form a sense of actorness outside of the classic power 
political rhetoric of the nation state.79  
This section aims to provide a general overview of how Åland came to exert such a “nuisance 
power” through a historical overview of the development of the Åland Example and the interactions 
of the internal political dynamics of Åland with developments around the wider world. This is 
necessary to understand the politicisation of these historical developments within the EU debates. 
Åland despite having earlier archaeological remains of Viking settlements was integrated fully in to 
the Swedish realm sometime during the 14th century.80 It was then later incorporated in the Åbo-
Björneborg (Turku-Pori) district as a part of the Swedish government reform in 1634. 
 
77 For Peter Lindbäck’s claim to have created this concept see Svensson 1997, pp. 295-296. 
78See Fagerlund 1997 and Hayes 2011 
79 See Joeniemi 2003 and 2014 for more on Åland’s “nuisance power”  
80  See Ahola et al 2014 for Åland and the Viking legacy 
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The islands became subject of international attention when Sweden temporarily lost control over the 
islands in 1714 when Russia occupied mainland Finland. The islands were restored to Swedish 
control under the terms of the 1721 Treaty of Nystad but the islands were “henceforth an 
international problem”.81 The islands were once again occupied by Russia in 1742 but were 
promptly returned to Sweden through the treaty of Åbo a year later in 174382. In 1759, Sweden and 
Russia concluded an agreement with the intent on guarantying free trade and neutrality in the Baltic 
Sea region83. Russia attempted once again to control the islands in 1808 which led to the district of 
Åland being incorporated into the Uppland district of Sweden on 8 July 1808 and strict instructions 
were given to the Swedish negotiators that the Åland island were not to be conceded in any case but 
their room for manoeuvre was limited, being on the losing side of the war84. 
Sweden permanently lost the whole territory of Finland with Åland to Russia in 1809 with the 
signature of the Treaty of Fredrikshamn. With this development, Åland became a part of the 
autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland who enjoyed a great deal of self-governance within the 
Russian Empire.85 
Due to its close proximity to the Swedish capital of Stockholm, Åland still had a crucial role to play 
within Russian-Swedish power politics. According to a quote attributed to Napoleon “the Åland 
Islands in the hands of a great power is like a pistol aimed at Sweden’s heart”.86 
Russia began developing plans to fortify the islands already from 1809 but due to several varying 
causes the plans were delayed until the 1850’s and the semi constructed Bomarsund fortress was 
caught off guard when the Crimean War began in 1854.87 During the peace negotiations which took 
place in the aftermath of the war, Sweden pushed for a number of possible options to handle this 
glaring security threat to its mainland which laid approximately 150 kilometres away: 
(1) That the Åland Islands shall be returned to Sweden or (2) That the Åland Islands shall be a made 
a “free state” which would be guaranteed by the UK, France or Sweden-Norway, and (3) that the 
islands would be demilitarised88 
 
81 Padelford et. al. 1939 p.466 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Barros 1968, p.2 
85 Mattsson-Eklund 2000, p. 257 
86 Quoted in Sliverström 2013, p. 11 
87 Robins 2004, pp.4-5. 
88 Padelford et al.1939. p.467. 
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The first two options were not considered to be viable options. Demilitarisation, however, was look 
upon favourably by the winning French-British alliance The Paris Peace Treaty that was signed in 
1856 between Russia, France and the United Kingdom, declared that:  
“..the Åland Islands shall not be fortified, and that no military or naval establishments whatsoever 
shall be maintained or created there”89 
According to De Geer-Hancock, this treaty was the founding moment of the “Islands of Peace” 
discourse in which Åland received a special profile in the Nordic region.90 Therewith the first pillar 
of the international legal regime regarding the Åland islands, demilitarisation, was established.  
The arrangement regarding the demilitarisation of Åland has also been labelled as the “Åland 
servitude”.91 
At the beginning of the First World War, Russia initially did not place any active military presence 
on the island but after a German attack on 21 August 1915, it was revealed that Russia had sent a 
certain number of troops and batteries on the islands. Sweden issued a protest claimed the violation 
of the 1856 treat but Russia claimed that militarisation on the island was of temporary nature and 
caused no change in the islands’ status. However, the developments in the following year followed 
a trajectory of further increased militarisation and Sweden was only prevented from declaring war 
on Russia through guarantees given from France and the UK regarding the status of the islands.92  
3.1 The Rise of the Åland Movement 1917-1921 
 
The following year, 1917 would be host to even more dramatic events not only for the Baltic Sea 
region and Åland but from a global perspective also. Most notable among these is the collapse of 
the Russian Empire and the birth of several newly independent states, among them Finland. 
Already in the early stages of 1917, certain voices on Åland had expressed their concern regarding 
the future of island and its population. This movement would later be described as the Åland 
Movement.93 
 
89 Convention on the Demilitarisation of the Åland Islands, 1856. 
90 De Geer-Hancock 1986 p. 23 
91 Björkholm and Rosas 1990, p.22 
92 Mattson-Eklund 2000, p. 315. 
93 Ålandrörelsen in Swedish. 
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 This culminated in a meeting at the Ålands Folkhögskola on 20 August 1917. The representatives 
came mainly from the rural Åland mainland94, while the archipelago95 was not represented.9697 The 
meeting resulted in a unanimous statement which claimed that Åland, as an ancient Swedish 
province, should be reunited with Sweden after the fall of the Russian empire. At the meeting it was 
also decided that a deputation be sent to the Swedish king with the demand that Sweden actively 
work towards incorporating Åland into its territory.98 This statement, made months before Finland’s 
independence on 6 December 1917, can be considered a contributing factor in the Committee of 
Jurists’ of the League of Nation statement regarding that the sovereignty of Åland could not be 
considered only as an internal Finnish matter.99 
 
Figure 1: Municipal Districts on Åland100 
After Finnish independence on 6 December 1917 efforts on Åland continued with an attempt to 
legitimise their claim to self-determination. These efforts resulted in a hastily arranged petition in 
 
94 Called Landsbygden in Swedish. 
95 Called Skärgården in Swedish. 
96 Kurt Lindh 1984 p.35  
97 The division between the City, the Countryside and the Archipelago has a crucial role in Ålandic politics and will be 
given more attention below 
98Ibid. 
99 League of Nations 1921 
100 Source: http://old.regeringen.ax/.composer/ls-prot/NARING/2014/N2014P02_130514.html 
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which 7.135 names which were collected in less than a week.101 On 29 December 1917 it was 
decided that the petition would be forwarded by a delegation which included notable Ålandic public 
figures of the likes of future Speaker of the Parliament102 Julius Sundblom and Premier103 Carl 
Björkman. These plans were partially disrupted by eruption of the Finnish Civil War on 27 January 
1918 between the conservative “whites” and the socialist “reds”. Julius Sundblom, who was also the 
sole Ålandic member of the Finnish Parliament for the Swedish People’s Party104  at time, was 
considered on the side of the “whites” had to go undercover and therefore was absent when the 
petition reached Stockholm on 3 Feburary.105 It must be noted that at this point Sundblom had 
significant doubts about the possibility of the chances of a reunification with Sweden. He had 
personally subscribed to the Finland-Swedish form of identity and viewed Ålanders as a part of 
Finland’s Swedish minority rather than as Swedish diaspora which needed to return to its “home 
country”. His background as a politician is also relevant for his hesitations to leave legal politics 
and “play the international card”.106In other words as a part of the Finland Swedish establishment he 
was not whole heartedly to break with official line in Finland and join the Åland movement’s 
irredentist project. 
From a military perspective it must be reminded that while Finland declared independence, the First 
World War was still an ongoing process. This led to a situation where Finnish, Swedish, German 
and Russian soldiers all situated on the island simultaneously at a certain point. The intentions of 
the Swedish expedition to Åland are disputed although the actions of the Åland Movement have 
been claimed to be influential in the decision. This sort of extensive and direct inclusion in military 
affairs was not heard of since the Crimean War of 1853-56.107 
An interesting yet perhaps unfortunate event during the Finnish Civil war was the appointment of 
General von Bondsdorff as military governor by State Regent Mannerheim. By placing one of his 
loyalists in the Islands sole newspaper Åland108Von Bondsdorff attempted to control the narrative 
on the islands through heavy handed censorship. Additionally, he felt the need to remind the 
Ålanders that: “The judgment of history will not be kind upon traitors and cowards.”109 
 
101 Kurt Lindh 1984 p.38 
102 Talmanen in Swedish 
103 Landrådet in Swedish. 
104 Svenska Folkpartiet in Swedish. 
105 The Reds were in control of the Southern part of Finland at the time, including the capital region 
106 Salminen 1979, pp. 47-75 
107 See Barros 1968, pp. 75-83. For the Swedish expedition to Åland in 1918. 
108 Founded by Julius Sundblom 1891 which gave Sundblom a unique role in formulating the ”Ålandic position” on 
certain issues.  
109 De Geer-Hancock 1985 p.38  
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This hostility from the governor’s side is said to have helped the Åland Movement by firmly 
rooting resentment towards Finnish officials on the Åland Islands.110 
Sundblom returned to the Islands on May 1918 after the end of the Civil War and promptly 
requested the removal of von Bondsroff which was granted the following month.111 On 8 June 1918 
an Ålandic County Assembly (Landstinget) was formed on the island with Carl Björkman elected as 
Speaker. The post was originally offered to Sundblom but he refused on the grounds that it would 
mean a total break with the Finnish officials, which he was not willing to dare until he was 
confident of Swedish support. The intention was to form an assembly that would represent the 
Ålanders externally in the context of the Paris Peace Conference.112 While this was considered an 
illegal action from the viewpoint of Finnish law which was itself in a period of transition at that 
time, it could be considered one of the most important events in Ålandic paradiplomatic affairs. 
In the light of the so-called Wilsonian Principle of Self-Determination, the Åland County Assembly 
sent out a message in November 1918 to the United States, Italy, France and the United Kingdom 
claiming that the “right of self-determination” be applied also for the population of Åland which 
would make possible a referendum on a future reunion with Sweden.113 
The Swedish government supported the claims on the basis of historical and “racial” ties while 
Finland emphasized the long-lasting administrative link between the Åbo province and Åland. 
In January 1919, Julius Sundblom, Johannes Eriksson and Johan Jansson were sent to the Paris 
Peace Conference to put forward the reunification agenda in the international arena. Despite support 
from the Swedish side, the peace conference did not take any decision on the Åland question as 
more pressing issues were at hand.114 On their return to from Paris they were interrogated by an 
order of the Government of Finland and received a penalty which included a travel ban and a prison 
sentence for “treasonous activities”. However, the penalty was annulled by the State Regent 
Mannerheim shorty after.115 
During June 1919 the Åland movement yet again attempted at a petition with the aim of creating 
attention and legitimacy towards their political project. The question was then referred to the newly 
established League of Nations in the September of the same year. This led to proactive measures on 
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the Finnish side such as Mannerheim’s diplomacy in Paris which argue that a rightful solution of 
the Åland Question would allow “a white Finland” to intervene against a “red Russia” when 
needed. The leader of the Åland movement Sundblom reacted scathingly by claiming that the Åland 
Question was “not a question of states but rather a question of nationality”.116 
The Finnish state reacted by setting up a parliamentary committee117 which brought forward a 
proposal of autonomy for Åland in December 1919. This laid the basis of what would later become 
the autonomy law. Sundblom noted that although the proposal contained “certain benefits” it did 
not go far enough to offer protection for the Swedish language, and it was rejected by the Åland 
County Assembly in February 1920.118 However, a watered-down proposal was official adopted by 
the Parliament of Finland on 30 April 1920 by a majority of 157 to 27 and was refused by the Åland 
County Assembly as well when it came into power on 6 May. At the end of the month the 
Assembly sent another delegation to Stockholm with the intention to remind the Swedish king and 
Government that the Ålanders had not changed their political goal which was reunion with Sweden 
and not autonomy.119 As a reaction to this visit, the Finnish Prime Minister Rafael Erich decided to 
visit Åland on 4 June 1920 as attempt to convince the leadership to apply the newly adopted 
autonomy law. This ended in failure when the leadership represented by Sundblom insisted that 
Ålanders had every right to decide on their future on the same basis that the other peoples of the 
fallen Russian Empire had been able to.120 After his speech the Ålandic representatives left the 
meeting in protest and Sundblom and Björkman were arrested on the grounds of “conspiracy to 
commit high treason” and received a year and a half-long prison sentence. However, they were 
pardoned by the President only 5 weeks in. This turn of events drew international attention, first and 
foremost in Sweden which withdrew its ambassador in Helsinki and engaged in an “intensive 
exchange of diplomatic notes” with Finland.121 
The issue was then brought to the League of Nations by the initiative of the British122 in the 
following month as a matter falling under Article 11 which stipulates that member states have the 
 
116 Quoted in Mattson-Eklund 2000, p.329 
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right to submit matters “affecting international relations which threaten to disturb international 
peace or the good understanding upon which peace stands”.123  
As a result, the League of Nations established two committees, the committee of Rapporteurs and 
the Committee of Jurists in July 1920 which would examine the Åland Question in relation to 
international law. 
The Committee of Jurists had to deal with two main legal issues; (1) If the question of sovereignty 
over Åland was still open to dispute and (2) If the international guarantees from 1856 were still in 
force.124 
On 5 September 1920 the Committee of Jurists had decided that the matter did indeed fall within 
the legal competence of the League of Nations and that the demilitarisation agreement from 1856 
was still in effect.125 As a result, the Committee of Rapporteurs visited Sweden, Finland and Åland 
before releasing their final statement on the issue on 16 April 1921. The Committee argued that he 
sovereignty of the islands belong to Finland with some notable restrictions. These included 
internationally guaranteed support to maintain the Swedish character of the islands. This decision 
was justified on several historical and geopolitical reasoning, the main arguments included: 
 -That the administrative separation between Sweden and Åland had occurred earlier than 1809 and 
that Åland was historically a part of the Åbo district 
-that the separation of Åland would affect Finland Swedes’ relations with the Finnish majority and 
could potentially endanger Finland’s entrance to “the Scandinavian group of states” 
-that neither Swedish nor Finnish sovereignty of the islands would constitute a threat for the other, 
-that the geographically the border between Sweden and Finland had been the Sea of Åland  
-that Finland’s role in combating “Bolshevik communism” was to be taken into account.126  
Based on this report, the League of Nations decided on the 24 June 1921 while the islands were to 
be considered under Finnish sovereignty, Finland would need to take further legal action. In terms 
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of demilitarisation, it was decided that a new agreement needed to be signed to prevent a similar 
military build-up as was experienced in the First World War.127 
The new guarantees proposed by the League aimed at preserving the Swedish language, to keep 
landownership in the hands of the locals, to determine restrictions on non-Ålanders rights to 
political participation and to ensure Ålandic participation in the selection of the governor of the 
islands. Additional Article 7 of this decision gave the right for Ålandic officials to appeal to the 
League of Nations should they fall into conflict with Finnish officials regarding the application of 
the guarantees128These guarantees were confirmed by a text agreed upon by Finland and Sweden 
and was annexed to the resolution of 24 June three days later.129 This has been frequently labelled 
the “Åland Agreement” although varying interpretations of the validity of this claim in terms of 
international law have been brought forward.130 The decision was implemented through the 
Guarantee Act passed by the Parliament of Finland in August 1922. 
The military status of Åland was taken up again by the League on 20 October 1921. This resulted in 
a multilateral agreement regarding the neutralisation of the islands with the intention to ensure “that 
these islands may never become a cause of danger from a military point of view”131. The 
convention confirmed the validity of the 1856 demilitarisation convention, added the neutralisation 
of the islands and further expanded the number of parties involved in the Åland regime with the 
signatures of Britain, France, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Germany, Sweden and 
Finland. This treaty added limitations not only to the fortification of the island but also put 
restrictions on the capabilities of the host country (Finland) to maintain a military presence on the 
islands, albeit with exceptions not granted to the other signatories. 
With this the Åland Question had been concluded from the perspective of international law, Finland 
had ensured its sovereignty over the islands and Sweden had strengthened the demilitarisation 
agreement from 1856 through international engagement which led to the neutralisation of the 
islands. However, from the perspective of the Åland Movement and its consolidated leader Julius 
Sundblom this was hardly a satisfactory result. Their ideological commitment to irredentist 
nationalism simply did not have the same ideological power on the Swedish front once their 
geopolitical concerns were taken care of. 
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3.2. Autonomy Despite the People 1922-1945 
 
The reaction from the Åland Movement towards the agreement of 24 and 27 June 1921 was 
summarized as a “deathblow” by Julius Sundblom in his newspaper Ålandstidingen132. Although 
the Åland settlement is considered to be a model in solving ethnic conflicts through mediation, it 
must be noted that the predominant mood among Ålandic elites were far from convinced that the 
League of Nations decision had concluded the Åland episode. Their fear of “förfinsking”133and 
Finland joining the Soviet sphere of influence were very much intact, at least in rhetoric. 
Concrete expressions of this disappointment was the breaking of all formal ties with the Swedish 
People’s Party in Finland and the failure of the concept of Finland Swede134 to gain hold on the 
islands who via Sundblom’s ideological drive and control over the local media, emphasised their 
regional identity (i.e. being an Ålander) above all other forms of markers of identity.135 
Between the period of the introduction of universal suffrage in the Grand Duchy of Finland in the 
year 1906 and the 1919 election which took place during the Åland Crisis, the Swedish People’s 
Party  was clearly the dominate political force on the island. The SFP’s voter support gathered at 
least 90 percent of the Ålandic vote during this period and considered Åland to be one of its 
strongholds.136 The relation between the Ålandic leadership and the SFP soured when the party 
supported the offer of autonomy towards the island group and the regional sections of the party 
were shut down as a result of this disagreement in 1919. This created a form of power vacuum 
which left the significantly weaker Social Democrats (also active from 1906) and the Communists 
remaining in the field of party politics on Åland.137 
The new “legal” regional parliament, also named Landstinget, held its first elections on 8 May 1922 
which resulted in a huge victory for Sundblom’s Ålands Svenska Valförbund138 which received 29 
out of the 30 mandates in the Landsting while the only opposition seat went to Johannes Holmberg 
under the Självständiga Åläninngarnas Förbund139, who held a contrary line to the Ålands 
Movement and was an open advocate of autonomy for Åland and not for secession to Sweden. It 
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should be noted that these were not political parties in the traditional sense but rather election lists 
that were only activated prior to election.  
This Landsting took office on 9 June 1922 and this day is now celebrated as Självstyrelsedagen140. 
It is interesting from a nation building perspective to note that instead of taking the date of the 
League of Nation decision regarding the “Åland Agreement” the Ålandic officials decided that the 
first meeting of the Landsting was a more appropriate occasion to mark the importance of the day.  
On 1 August 1922 the office of Landrådet141 was established as the head of the Landskapsnämd142 
and Carl Björkman was appointed to the post. De Geer-Handcook notes that the meeting of the 
“legal” regional parliament constitutes a starting point in terms of nation building on the Åland 
Islands. The leadership made sure to verbally distance themselves from the Finnish state through 
using the term Riket. Additionally, a national anthem was created in the same year and a separate 
tripartite blue and yellow flag was put into use as a sign of a separate Ålandic identity in relation to 
Finland.143 
It must be noted that the establishment of the autonomy did not immediately produce a party system 
similar to the rest of the Nordic region. In fact, Matt Drejer, the “national archaeologist of Åland” 
describes the politics of Åland during this period as “an untouched idyll” in terms of developing 
political cleavages.144 
Several reasons can be pointed out for this relative lack of political organisation on Åland during 
this period. The most important factor can be highlighted through the character of Julius Sundblom, 
whose biography titled “the King of Åland” was written by author Johannes Salminen.145 Through 
ownership of the paper Åland146, his position in the local bank and position as Speaker of 
Parliament, he established a very unique and unusually powerful position in Ålandic society which 
allowed him to set the tone of Ålandic politics until his death in 1945.147 He was staunchly against 
the practice of party politics on the grounds that Åland was too small to afford internal quarrels and 
fraction building. Similarly, the “language question” between Finnish and Swedish speakers that 
constituted a separate political cleavage in the context of Finland, played a unifying role in Ålandic 
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politics.148 From the economic perspective Ålands economy lacked any large industry and in place 
one can observe the importance of seafaring, agriculture and fishing which some argue has created a 
much more individualistic political culture than the typical understandings of the solidarity based 
political culture of the Nordic nation states in which the working class have played a more 
significant role.149 There were also institutional constraints regarding the building of a party system 
on Åland. The relationship between the Regional Assembly and the Regional Administration did 
not resemble a parliamentary system until 1988, The Regional Administration would be appointed 
proportionally according to each party’s mandate which blurred the line between opposition and 
government. Additionally, the sheer smallness of Ålandic society can increase the role of personal 
relationship within the political sphere, making certain issues a matter between persons and not of 
ideology.150 
In light of these structural factors the elections of 1925 and 1928 were received with a low voter 
turnout and a similar result for the Sundblom camp.151 The 1931 elections saw the first Social 
Democratic member of the regional parliament (MP), Karl Hussell, enter the legislative assembly 
with a clear party affiliation, although he lost his seat in the next election of 1934 to regain it 
1937.152 The 1937 elections were the last ones to be held before the outbreak of the Second World 
War.  
The 1930’s were a difficult time both in a global context and on the local context as well. The 
approaching war pressed Finland and Sweden to take action and Åland was once again on the 
international arena. It was revealed that the Sweden and Finland had mutually agreed to fortify the 
islands and that the Premier of Åland, Carl Björkman had agreed to it with the hopes that a military 
contribution from the Ålanders would result in an expanded autonomy alongside the prevention of 
the arrival of Finnish speaking troops on the island.153 As a reaction Julius Sundblom organized a 
protest during October 1938 which was later to be labelled the “Farmers March” in which 4000 
people, i.e. 20 percent of the total population of the islands.154 This has been considered the first 
time where public discourse about the legal status regarding demilitarisation and neutralisation was 
brought into the Ålandic political sphere.155 The immediate consequence of this protest was the 
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resignation of Björkman as a result of a motion of no-confidence from the Landsting, who since the 
early days of the Åland Movement had a leading role in Ålandic politics. The plans came to nothing 
when it was rejected by the Soviet Union. Although the protest has been interpreted as a sign of the 
commitment of the Ålanders to ideological pacifism by Johannes Salminen156, this has been 
disputed by other authors on the basis that Sundblom feared that the Ålanders would be 
incorporated into Finnish speaking milititary troops which would in turn have an effect on the 
Ålanders’ political and linguistic attitudes and values.157  
The Åland Islands were not directly involved in the battlefield of the Second World War but 
Finnish military presence had existed on the islands according to the exception given to Finland in 
the 1921 treaty to defend the island during times of war.158 
As a result of the Winter War a bilateral treaty was signed on 11 October 1940 between the Soviet 
Union and Finland which reaffirmed the demilitarisation of the islands.159 This gave the Soviet 
Union, and later Russia, to maintain a consulate on the islands to supervise the agreement. 
Demilitarisation was confirmed once again in Article 5 of the Paris Peace Treaty in 1947160. 
At the end of the war in 1945 both Finland and Åland were in a precarious situation. Finland had 
maintained its independence but as a result of the 1948 Treaty of Friendship,Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance, it was forced to follow a very cautious foreign policy which also affected Åland 
in a significant way. 
3.3 Acceptance and Expansion of Autonomy 1945-1989 
 
The abolishment of the League of Nations, which was the legal organ that supervised the Guarantee 
Law of 1922 caused worry among the parliamentarians on Åland. This was due to the newly 
established United Nations was not considered to be the legal successor of the League of Nations 
and the ideological drive from the Ålandic side to reunite with Sweden.161 Sundblom had also 
learned that during September 1944 in a moment of desperation the Finnish government had offered 
Hangö and Åland to Stalin who insisted on the Porkala military base outside the Finnish capital162.  
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The Åland Parliament insisted that it needed representation within the Finnish delegation at the 
Paris Peace Negotiations, that the current autonomy act was insufficient and furthermore that the 
Ålanders still desired to join Sweden. The demand for representation was rejected but the Prime 
Minister of Finland Paasikivi contacted the Ålandic leadership and warmly indicated that the 
Finnish government was ready to negotiate a new autonomy agreement163.  
Sundblom visited Stockholm to once again attempt to convince the Swedish government to take 
interest in Åland however received a cold reception from the Swedish Prime Minister Per Albin 
Hanson. This was Sundblom’s last paradiplomatic action as a politician and he died in the summer 
of 1945. 
Elections were held in April 1945 after the activities of war had ended and it resulted in a 
confirmation of the dominance of the Sundblom line advocated by Ålandstidningen with some 
reservations. Ålänningarnas valförbund 1 and 2164 winning 26 seats, Fria valförbundet165 winning 2 
seats and the Ålands arbetares valförbund166 winning 2 seats. The new Landsting sent a new 
message to the government in Helsinki noting that the application of the guarantee law was 
insufficient and additional measures would need to be taken to protect the Swedish character of the 
islands.167 The only reservation towards this declaration came from the representative of the 
Folkdemokraterna which was an extension of the communist party on Finnish mainland. The 
following elections in 1948 followed a similar line with 27 seats going to Ålänningarnas 
valförbund, 2 to the People’s Democrats and 1 to the Social Democrats.168 
It was now the task of a new generation of Ålandic politicians to set a political agenda considering 
the vacuum Sundblom left behind him. After the death of Sundblom and the sunset of the 
reunification ideology with Sweden, a new form of leadership took over which departed from the 
irredentism of the old. This leadership mostly associated with the new Speaker Thorwald 
Eriksson169 based on the ideology that the institutions of autonomy should be used to develop the 
national distinctiveness of the Ålanders.170 This ideology focused much more on the civil side of the 
Ålandic people, in which the ethnic affiliation towards Sweden was replaced with a discourse on the 
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importance of the Ålanders to govern themselves within the legal institutions of the autonomy act. 
This added an extra layer of differentiation between not only the Finnish state but also with the 
Finland Swedes.171  A clear manifestation of this new autonomy ideology was the publication of a 
small brochure, authored by Eriksson in 1965 in several languages, including English.172 
Linguistically, this document provides the basis of the new understanding of the autonomy which 
labels the “Åland Agreement” from 24 and 27 June 1921 as “Ålands Magna Carta” which 
emphasizes that the application of this agreement constitutes a “basic obligation” for Finland and a 
“basic right” for Åland173. The hembygdsrätt is labelled as “citizenship”, the landskapstyrelse a 
“government”, the Landsting a “parliament”. It also discusses the implications of the term 
province174and notes that in the word province in the context of Åland stands for: “a community 
with a high degree of self-government, with its own national identity, its own elected Parliament 
and its own central administration, ‘a state within a state’”175. This formed a political doctrine in 
which Ålandic politics were formulated with a clear territorial framework and persistent demands 
for an expansion of autonomy.176 
The first immediate challenge after the Second World War was to negotiate the new Autonomy Act 
with the Finnish state177. After long discussions and a dispute regarding the internationally 
guaranteed nature of the autonomy arrangement178, the new autonomy act was accepted by both 
parliaments in 1951. 
The new autonomy act introduced a new form of identity symbolism for the Ålanders; the concept 
of the hembygdsrätt179. This legal construction increased the political power of the regional 
authorities over the participation of newcomers to Ålandic society by putting certain restrictions on 
immigrants’ participation in Ålandic society. According to the new autonomy act, the regional 
citizenship would be granted on approval to the Regional Government after a 5-year residency on 
the Åland provided that they also had Finnish citizenship.180. Without this regional citizenship it 
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would be impossible for one to participate in elections for Ålandic local and regional elections, buy 
or sell property on Åland or to partake in business that requires a permit from the local 
authorities181.  
Although the new autonomy act had increased the legal authority of the Åland authorities, the 
overall proposal was in no way uncontroversial. The proposal passed with a 17-10 majority. 
Magnus Wrede notes that in terms of autonomy policies a cleavage between two groups could be 
observed.182  
1- A political fraction that frequently refers to the legal defence mechanism of the autonomy act, 
emphasised the importance of the Swedish language and customs, emphasizes the fear of 
Finnisation on Åland and the importance of maintaining close relations with Sweden. (The Legality 
Line)183 
2- A political fraction which emphasizes good relations with the state, does not view an impending 
fear of Finnisation on Åland and downplays the defence mechanism aspect of the autonomy act as 
the primary aim of the politics of autonomy. (The Pragmatic Line)184 
It should be noted that this cleavage does not imply that these two lines disagree on wither to 
increase Åland’s autonomy but rather how that should be achieved. None of the representatives of 
either side argue in favour of transferring authority to Finland. 
The second symbolically important action regarding the construction of the Ålandic identity in this 
period was the adoption of an official flag for the autonomous region. After the autonomy act took 
effect in January 1952 the Landsting passed a law proposing a new flag for the autonomous region. 
The design was based on a typical Nordic cross with a dark blue bass and yellow cross with another 
dark blue cross filling. The Finnish president Paasikivi did not appreciate the colour scheme 
deeming it to be too similar to the Swedish flag and he vetoed the proposal. The Ålandic side then 
came up with another proposal which was also to be rejected and a compromise was reached when 
the Finnish president approved the proposal with a Nordic cross on a blue base, yellow cross and a 
red filling within that cross.185.  
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Figure 2: Flag proposals from the Landsting to the President186 
In terms of party politics Ålands Tidningen, in the shadow of Julius Sundblom, still maintained a 
negative view on the fracturing of Ålandic society and dividing “the Ålandic party”.187 This 
seemingly had an effect on the Social Democrats who officially cut their ties with the Finnish party 
in 1948 and sought cooperation with the dominant right-wing organisations.188The party did not 
participate in the 1951 elections allowing the more radical People’s Democrats to be the 
predominant left wing party on Åland albeit with only 1 mandate compared to the 29 of the 
Ålänningarnas valförbund. The People’s Democrats increased their seats to two the following 
election in 1954 while the Social Democrats got one seat within the larger right-wing bloc189. 
The year 1957 saw the establishment of the Ålands Samling190 which is better characterised as an 
umbrella organisation than a traditional political party191as the replacement for Ålänningarnas 
Valförbund. The Social Democrats pursued their political goals (and achieved 4 seats in the 
parliament) within this umbrella while the People’s Democrats remained isolated as the only 
political organisation which identified as a political party192. 
Up until this period Åland remained an overwhelmingly agrarian society which was dominated by 
the farming and fishing sectors. The political left remained significantly weak due to sheer 
numerical inferiority (i.e. lack of large industry) and organisational weakness and the ties of the 
People’s Democrats to the Finnish People’s Democrats drew suspicion among the nationalist 
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agrarian leadership which were the majority in the common election lists on grounds that it 
provided an alternative to the existing economic order and that they were connected to the Finnish 
communists.193  
From the late 1950’s onwards a new form of economic activity would come to characterise the 
Ålandic economic structure, which would be taken into consideration during the EU membership 
negotiations: tourism. Prior to the introduction of regular ferry lines, the Åland islands received 
around 39.000 summer tourists in 1958, the year after that the number rose to 64.000 and to 
116.000 the following year. By the turn of the century the number of summer visitors had reached 
1.700.000.194 
By 1963 the Åland Samling was internally dived into List 1 (right leaning) and List 2 (left leaning) 
fractions which then officially split into smaller factions in the following elections195. List 1 gained 
22 seats while List 2 gained 7, the People’s Democrats won 1 seat. This was the last election in 
which any party to the left of the Social Democrats gained representation in the Regional 
Parilament. Åland Samling still maintained its umbrella status within elections to the Finnish 
parliament but withdrew from the politics of the Landsting.  
The following elections of 1967 showed a permanent split and step forward toward a clearly 
defined multi-party system. The List 1 of the Ålands Samling split into a conservative urban based 
party Frisinad Samverkan (FS)196 and a liberal urban based Mittenliberalerna197 which got 4 and 2 
seats respectively. The remainder of List 1 formed the Landsbygdens och Skärgårdens valförbund 
(LoS)198 and received 20 seat which was a predominately rural political movement as evident in its 
name. The rest of the 4 seats went to the Social Democratic Löntagarnas lista199. The People’s 
Democrats lost their only seat. Magus Wrede describes this fragmentation of the political arena as 
the result of the reaction of the urban ideological groupings and the rural reaction towards it.200  It is 
also noteworthy to consider that this election was the first time the voter turnout exceeded 50 
percent in Regional elections, a sign of increasing acceptance of party politics on the islands and the 
consolidation of ideological differences.201 
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The two other main internal developments during this decade were the pressure put on the state 
officials, namely the president, to approve the construction plans for the new parliament house 
which bore fruit in the so.-called Project 77and the quarrel between the Speaker Thorvald Erikson 
and the Primer Martin Isaksson in 1968. The later event can be considered the biggest internal 
quarrel on Åland since the split between Sundblom and Björkman in 1938. The main point of 
conflict was that the Speaker, also the chief of the Bank of Åland at the time had struck a deal with 
a Swedish construction group that would build summer homes and would then sell them to 
customers from Sweden and Finland. This obviously required a circumvention of the rules 
regarding the regional citizenship and Finnish legislation regarding land ownership and the Speaker 
was willing to offer concession to the Swedes which in contrast the Primer reminded that the same 
must be done for Finnish citizens.202 Due to the intensive debate in the media the plans were never 
realised as the company withdrew its bid, but this event showed once again the split in the political 
area between the Legality Line and the Pragmatic Line. 
Toward the end of the decade the Regional Administration and the Regional Parliament attempted 
to acquire some form of participation in the Nordic Council. Although met with some resistance on 
the Finnish side initially, the Danish initiative to offer representation to the Faroe Islands assisted 
the Ålandic intention in receiving their own representation in the Nordic Council in 1970.203 This 
can be considered another important turning point for Åland’s paradiplomacy. With membership in 
the Nordic Council the members of parliament had access to an official forum in which they could 
establish contacts beyond regional and national borders. Additionally, the symbolic gesture of the 
Ålandic flag being hoisted alongside the other Nordic nations’ flags has had profound effect in the 
minds of the Ålandic members of parliament and will play a role in the discussions regarding 
European Integration as well. 
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Figure 3: The Självstyrelsegården was completed in 1978204 
The 1971 elections saw the appearance of the independent political lists, the Social Democrats were 
now a separate organisation from the umbrella party of the previous decades. The election results 
were along the lines of the previous one with LoS meaning a majority with 18 seats, Frisinad 
Samverkan (FS) gaining 4, Social Democrats gaining 4, the Liberals gaining 2 and Allmänna 
valförbundet 205gained 2.  
The fractionalisation of politics continued in the following election of 1975 with LoS-Liberalarrna 
breaking from LoS and FS-Framstegsgrupp splitting from FS. The division of the seats were as 
follows: LoS 9 seats, LoS-Liberalerna 7 seats, Social Democrats 5 seats, Liberals 3 seats, FS 3 
seats, ÅF 2 and FS-Framstegsgrupp 1. According to Wrede LoS, FS-Framsteg and ÅF (12 seats) 
can be described as belonging to the The Legality Line and the Social Democrats, Los-Liberalerna, 
Liberals, and FS as the group belonging to The Pragmatic Line (18 Seats)206.   
After this election, activities within the LoS brought forward the solidification of party politics on 
Åland with the arrival of the Ålandic Centre207 in 1976 which combined the LoS group with ÅF and 
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FS-Framsteg.208 Furthermore, the Los-Liberalerna group fused with the Centre Liberals to form 
Liberals for Åland209in 1978. 
The last election of the decade in 1979 saw the establishment of a party system that resembled the 
other party systems in the Nordic nation states with some notable exceptions. The Centre Party 
became the dominate force with 14 seats, the Liberals gained 9 seats, the conservative FS gained 4 
and the Social Democrats gained 3. The communist Ålandic Left also participated but failed to gain 
any seats.210 
The 1970’s on Åland may be interpreted as a period of increased politicisation and societal change. 
In the economic context it has been said that Åland has “skipped” over the industrialisation of 
society associated with modernism and the construction of national identity211. From being an 
agricultural society, the islands became a service society which in turn led to a significant 
urbanisation around the capital (Mariehamn) region and led to the development of well organised 
Social Democratic organisation which in turn became a motivating factor for right wing political 
parties to organize. The anxieties related to these have caused an anxiety of depopulation of the 
countryside and the archipelago and suspicion toward centralisation not only within Åland but also 
towards centralisation to Brussels as a result of European integration. 
It should also be noted that the absence of a strong unifying leader with overwhelming economic 
and societal influence can also be considered as a contributing factor in the development of the 
Ålandic party system.212 
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Figure 4: The chronology of the development of the party system213 
In the figure above the political parties are presented roughly according their perceived economic 
policies. It must be said that this is not confirmed by political science research and the limited 
autonomy in the realm of economic policy makes it difficult to predict the actual preferred 
economic policies of the parties. The 1951 Autonomy Act was quite limited in the authority it 
bestowed upon the Regional Parliament.  With the expansion of financial autonomy with the 
introduction of the “lump sum” system in 1991, the Ålandic Parliament gained at distributive 
authority which created some understanding of bloc politics. This posed the Social Democrats and 
Liberals on the side that is sceptical of obtaining more taxation authority with the Centre, the 
conservative FS and Unaligned Coalition insist on the total overtaking of taxation powers by 
Åland.214 
With the 1979 election, one can observe the formalisation of cleavages in Ålandic society between 
the urban-rural divide something that would have repercussions for the EU process as well. 
The following decade brought forward several events which would have a profound effect on the 
political and social dimensions of Ålandic society. 
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In 1981 the traditional single-newspaper characteristic of the media landscape on the islands finally 
came to a stop. This occurred when the chief editor for Ålandstidnignen, Hasse Svensson215, who 
was fired by the board of directs alongside most of his editorial board, decided to form a new, 
reader owned co-op newspaper titled Nya Åland.216217 On the legislative field, The Regional 
Parliament also set a committee to explore at the possibilities of a transition into a full 
parliamentary system in which the Regional Government would be formally reliant on the 
confidence of the Regional Parliament.218 
In the same year, an intra-Nordic meeting regarding the establishment of the Nordic region as a 
permanent “nuclear free” zone took place in the context of the arms race between the United States 
and the Soviet Union219. It attracted around 400 activists and politicians from the region and the 
idea of the Åland Islands as “The Islands of Peace” were put forth by the Speaker of the Parliament 
Sune Carlsson.220 This concept provided a new rhetorical device for both the Ålandic left and the 
right to promote the islands as a peaceful solution to minority conflicts. In this a light an Ålands 
Peace Association was founded which would then lead to the establishment of The Åland Islands 
Peace institute in 1992.221   The demilitarised and neutralised status of the islands were incorporated 
into the political agenda of the Regional Government which began acting more proactively towards 
the legal status of the islands222 where as it was largely considered an issue for the Finnish Ministry 
of Defence in prior times.223This would be source of disagreement between the Finnish and Ålandic 
governments in the EU process. 
The next elections occurred in 1983 which produced similar results as the election before: 11 seats 
for the Centre Party, 9 for the Liberals, 5 for the FS and 5 for the Social Democrats. The Ålandic 
Left failed again to gain seats and disbanded after the election.224 
1984 saw another symbolically important development in terms of relations with the state, which 
allowed the Åland authorities to print their own postage stamps.225 
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Figure 5: One of Åland’s first postal stamps226 
In 1987 Åland got two new political actors on the parliamentary scene; the Greens227 which were a 
part of the larger Green movement in the rest of the Nordic region and Europe and the Non-Aligned 
Coalition228a self-described “non-party” which refused to adopt a party program but have 
maintained a right wing profile.229   
The election in 1987 resulted in 9 seats for the Centre, 8 seats for the Liberals, 5 for the FS, 4 for 
the Social Democrats, 2 for the Greens and 2 for the Non-Aligned230. With the introduction of 
parliamentary government in 1988, a Regional Government was installed on the basis of a 
parliamentary majority and Primer who was directly responsible to the parliament. The first 
coalition government consisted of the Centre Party, the Liberals and the FS and was led by the 
Liberal Sune Eriksson.  
The efforts on the Ålandic side from the early 1970’s onwards to renew the autonomy act of 1951 
resulted in the setting of a parliamentary committee consisting of representatives from both the 
region and the state that finalized its proposals for a new autonomy act in 1987.231The act was then 
ratified by both sides in 1991 and came into force in 1993. This act would further expand Åland’s 
autonomy within the fields of economy, culture, education and ability to affect international treaties 
signed by Finland.232 The ability of the region to affect Finland’s participation to international 
treaties is regulated through Chapter 9 of the Autonomy Act233. Section 58 stipulates that the 
Regional Government of Åland may propose negotiations regarding a treaty with a foreign state and 
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be informed of the negotiations if deemed appropriate. The Regional Government is also reserved 
the right to participate in negotiations regarding international treaties if seen to be appropriate.234 
Section 59 stipulates that if a treaty contains a provision that is subject to the authority of Åland, the 
Regional Parliament must give its consent in order for the provision to be considered valid on 
Åland235. This had two importance consequences for Ålandic paradiplomacy; firstly gaining the 
capacity to propose an international treaty to the Government of Finland if it viewed it necessary 
and secondly the ability to force Finland to take into account the interests of Åland before entering 
an international agreement.  
3.4 Summary of the Political and Economic Cleavages on Åland in the Beginning 
of the 1990’s 
 
By the early 1990’s the political field consisted of 5 parties representing different sections of the 
Ålandic electorate. The largest party was the Centre Party which has been considered as the 
successor of the Sundblom and Eriksson line of autonomy politics, that is a relatively aggressive 
profile in autonomy politics. The party has its base in the Countryside and the Archipelago while 
lacking similar influence in Mariehamn. The party emphasizes the antagonism between the city and 
countryside and between Finland and Åland 236 
The second largest party on the islands were the Liberals which have support among public sector 
workers and has a split voter base between Mariehamn, the Countryside and the Archipelago. It has 
had a relatively pragmatic profile in autonomy politics. It also has close links to the Swedish 
People’s Party in Finland.237 
The Frisinad Samverkan (FS) is a liberal conservative party with a strong support base in 
Mariehamn. It has a free market orientation and emphasises the importance of the family.238They 
have an aggressive rhetoric on autonomy policy but in terms of actual policy they have been more 
pragmatic.239This is evident also during the EU referendum process. 
The Social Democrats is a Social Democratic party and has affinity with the other Nordic Social 
Democratic parties commonly associated with the ‘Nordic model’. However due to the prevalence 
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of autonomy politics and a lack of an organised working class in urban regions, it has been 
significantly weaker than its Nordic counterparts. It emphasizes the importance of welfare policies 
and social equality.240 It has traditionally been perceived as the least aggressive party in terms of 
autonomy politics. 
The Unaligned Coalition was founded in 1987 by the more nationalistic elements of the Centre 
Party. They have insisted on not adopting a party program but have been labelled right wing.241 
They are clearly the most aggressive in terms of autonomy politics in Regional Parliament during 
this term. 
It should be noted that these parties are much smaller in scale than their Swedish and Finnish 
counterparties and single individuals can exert an enormous amount of influence regarding the 
parties’ positioning on certain policies.242 
European Integration was not on the agenda for the Regional Elections which took place on 20 
October 1991 which resulted in: 10 seats for the Centre Party, 7 seats for the Liberals, 6 seats for 
FS, 4 seats for the Social Democrats and 3 seats for the Non-Alligned Coalition.243 The Green Party 
on Åland lost its 2 seats and later disbanded as an organisation, unlike its Swedish and Finnish 
counterparts which were to become regular governmental parties. The Regional Government was 
formed by Ragnar Erlandsson, leader of the Centre Party with a coalition of the FS and the Social 
Democrats. 
 
Figure 6: Presentation of the Political Parties in the Regional Parliament in 1991. 
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On the economic side, it is also necessary to clarify the economic structure on Åland before the EU 
debates took place. Utilising a report on the EU’s possible effects on the Ålandic economy 
published by SIFO Future AB in 1992 it is possible to paint a picture of the state of the Ålandic 
economy at the time. According to this report of all the employed  on Åland 30 percent were in the 
service industry, 17 percent in traffic and communications244, 15 percent in trade, roughly 10 in 
agriculture (farming and fishing)245, 13 percent in industry  and 15 percent in banking.246 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of Employment per Sector. 
From the given statistics it can be concluded that the economy of Åland was dominated by the 
service and information-based economy. This economic structure can be considered an explanatory 
factor towards the positivity towards membership on the side of the largely urban based Social 
Democrats and the conservative FS.  Fishing and farming-maintained 10 percent of all employment 
(a relatively high percentage in a comparative perspective) of was particularly an issue for the rural 
based Centre Party and the Unaligned due to those sectors being directly EU competences. The 
Liberals, being a regionally spread out party emphasized Liberal ideals of integration and 
cooperation over regional and sectoral interests. 
When analysing the population structure, we see a tripartite division between the capital Mariehamn 
city with its 10,429 people, the rural regions247 on mainland Åland with 12,290 people and the 
Archipelago248 with 2,439. Here we observe that the majority of Ålanders lived outside the city 
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which could explain the dominance of the Centre Party in the rural regions and the archipelago. The 
anxiety deriving from the depopulation of the rural regions and increased urbanisation on Åland is 
also evident among the members of this party, the Unaligned and FS MP from the archipelago 
Harry Eriksson. To compare the drastic change in regional demographics, in 1920 Mariehamn had 
only 1,403 residents, the rural regions on mainland Åland had 14.229 and the archipelago had 
5.949.249 
 
Figure 8: Population distribution according to region in 1994250 
3.5 Continuity and Change in Ålandic External Relations 
 
As analysed above, relations between Ålanders and the wider world has played a significant role in 
the political history of Åland and would play a role in the EU debates. The anxiety towards losing 
its Swedish character has been a crucial motivator for the Ålandic political leadership to for seek 
solutions outside. Both the Åland movement and the Åland government during the EU process 
sought out to seek out ways to ensure that Åland retains its monolingually Swedish status. The 
former sought refuge in “Mother Sweden” through contacts in Stockholm and the later sought out 
guarantees from the EU in Brussels. This stated the political goals were different, the former strictly 
being an irredentist movement while the later defended the autonomy arrangement and also claimed 
subjectivity on the military status of the islands. 
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Figure 9: Summary of the Political History of Åland 
4. Autonomy and European Integration 1989-1994  
 
The late 1980’s was a time of change in not only in Europe but from a global perspective. This 
section aims to summarise the foreign policy environment Finland and Åland found themselves in 
the post-Cold War era. This section will give an overview of the developments prior to the debate to 
provide an overview of conditions in which Åland began its referendum process and the political 
attitudes towards the EU by the members of legislature. 
Finland’s cautious foreign policy regarding a balance between “the East” and “the West” was being 
replaced with a clear western orientation.251 Finland became the last neutral European country to 
join the Council of Europe in 1989 and began negotiating the European Economy Area treaty 
between 1989 and 1991. Already during the EEA negotiations, it became clear that Åland was at a 
crossroads and had to choose between the “inner track” and the “outer track” in relation to ongoing 
 
251 Silverstörm 2002 p.9  
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integration process252. The main point of contention for the autonomy of Åland was that the 
measures regarding the Regional Citizenship and the restrictions regarding it were at clear odds 
with the “four freedoms” regarding free movement of capital, persons, services and labour. 
By “inner track” it is referred to the scenario in which Åland actively choses to join the integration 
process and perhaps seek membership of the EEA and later on the European Union. In this scenario 
it was necessary to negotiate a form of special arrangement or derogation in order to maintain the 
purpose (i.e. minority protection) of the restrictions regarding it.253 
The “outer track” refers to the situation in which Åland chooses to fully remain outside the 
integration processes just as the two other Nordic autonomies, the Faroes Islands and Greenland had 
chosen to do so earlier. However even in this scenario Åland would have needed some form of 
cooperation agreement with the EU such as some form of a cooperation agreement or a free trade 
agreement254.  
The chosen option was the “inner track” method with derogations, this was the basis of the EEA 
agreement which did not touch upon the restrictions involving Regional Citizenship, and was 
passed unilaterally by the Regional Parliament in November 1992 and the act came into force on 1 
January 1994.255 This non-controversy has been attributed to the fact that the restrictions regarding 
landownership and the right to certain professions were given derogations in the agreement.256 
The Regional Government realised that it would need close cooperation of the Regional Parliament 
according to the new Autonomy Act and established a parliamentary committee with all of the 
parties represented in the chamber. Additionally, the Regional Government periodically sent written 
messages regarding the membership negotiations to be debated in public.257 
Finland applied to join the European Community (EC) in March 1992 and the Regional 
Government consequently sent out the first communications to the Regional Parliament. This 
message noted that membership in the EC would be much more expansive than the EEA agreement 
and that the decision on membership would be one of the most important decisions since the 
establishment of autonomy.258 
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The second message regarding membership was sent to the Regional Parliament in August 1992 
which has been described as a “very ambitious agenda” by then-EU ambassador to Finland Eric 
Hayes.259 The two main objectives from the Regional Government was to ensure the protection of 
the autonomy arrangement and the sustainability of the local economy.260 The specific topics were 
stated to be in need of special regulation were: 
-The recognition of the Demilitarisation and Neutralisation of the islands 
-The legislative authority of Åland in regard to Community legislation 
-The unilingual Swedish speaking status of Åland 
-Restrictions on political participation of non-regional citizens to local and regional elections 
-Restrictions regarding property ownership 
-Restrictions regarding the right of trade on the islands 
-The right to have special commercial and tax laws on Åland 
-Satisfactory participation of Ålandic representatives in the EC decision making process261 
It was especially emphasized that due to the heavy dependency of the local economy to shipping 
and tourism, Åland would need exemptions in regards to the tax harmonisation within the union 
which would allow the continuation of tax free sales on ferries from and to Åland262. Fagerlund 
observes that one of the most interesting aspects of this message from the Regional Government is 
that it denies to take a position regarding Ålandic membership to the EC but rather notes that there 
were several options considering other Island regions which belong to EC member states but were 
kept out the union through special regulations.263He notes that this position is quite distinct from the 
official line of the Government of Finland which considered EC/EU membership to be the official 
political goal and actively pursued it.264 
In response, the Finnish government decided to form a joint committee in which the Regional and 
State officials would attempt to arrive at a common position in regard to the EC.265 
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From the side of the European Communities it was recognized in a report published in November 
1992 that the status of Åland would require a further examination considering its status under 
international law and the importance of the service sector to the local economy.266 This report was 
perceived positively from the Regional Government as it constituted an official recognition of the 
international legal arrangement regarding the islands, demilitarisation and neutralisation included. 
The demilitarised and neutralised status of the Åland Islands proved to be a heavy point of 
contestation between Åland and Finland. The activism on the Ålandic side can be attributed to the 
fear that the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Member States and the European Union 
could endanger the established status regarding the islands.267 On the Finnish side its was 
maintained that no mention of Åland’s international status, particularly the aspects regarding 
demilitarisation and neutralisation should be brought forward in the membership negotiations. It 
must be noted that the Finnish Government was also pressured from certain military circles who 
were in favour of a reconsideration or a total removal of demilitarisation and neutralisation in the 
post-Cold War security context.268 
After a number of bilateral meetings, a compromise was reached between the Finnish Foreign 
Ministry and the Ålandic Regional Government on 17 September 1993. This was to submit a 
unilateral declaration to the European Union that would be a part of the Final Act of the Accession 
Conference. This declaration would include the phrase “Åland’s established status under 
international law” which the Finnish Foreign Minister, Heikki Haavisto ensured was a reference to 
demilitarisation and neutralisation.269 
The Finnish Government then presented its position paper regarding the special provisions for 
Åland to the European Union in October 1993. This was taken up on a ministerial level EU meeting 
at Brussels on 22 Feburary 1994 in which the representatives of the Ålandic Government were also 
present. The result became Article 2 of the Finnish accession treaty to the European Union, more 
commonly known as the “Åland Protocol”.270 This amounted to a legal recognition of the 
permanent derogations demanded by the Ålandic side regarding the restrictions deriving from 
Regional Citizenship and the exclusion of the territory of Åland from the tax union.271 The main 
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surprise for the Finnish and Ålandic sides in the Åland Protocol was the last-minute addition of the 
phrase “the special status that Åland enjoys under international law” as the justification for the 
given derogations from the main principles of community law.272 
The substantive accession negotiations between Finland and the EU had concluded by 1 March 
1994, however there were two specific fields which would still cause some stress between the 
Finnish and Ålandic sides.273 These were communicated by the Åland Goverment to the Regional 
Parliament in their third message regarding the consequences of EU membership on 20 May 
1994.274The Regional Government noted that in order for the region to give its consent to join the 
EU, it would need a guarantee from the Finnish government that it would be granted the power to 
levy taxes on the islands if the Ålandic Government would express its desire to do so.275 The Åland 
Government also noted that it required satisfactory participation within the decision-making 
structures of the European Union and influence on EU policy making at the national level.276 A 
separate Member of the European Parliament was specifically singled out as vital for the region. 
These two political goals would be constitutive of the debates which were to follow. 
The Regional Government then decided to hold an advisory referendum on Åland in addition to the 
state-wide referendum on 16 October 1994. Only holders of the Regional Citizenship would be 
allowed to vote, and it would be held sometime after the results of the Swedish and Finnish 
referendums were clear.277However, this was not an entirely uncontroversial decision, the 
proposition passed with 22 votes in favour and 7 votes against. The strongest opposition came from 
the Social Democrats who noted that a decision that required a qualified majority should not be 
submitted to a basic majority among the voters and that neither Finland nor Åland did not have a 
tradition of using the referendum as a tool for public policy.278 In addition to 4 Social Democratic 
votes, 2 MP’s from the Centre Party and 1 MP from the conservative FS voted against the 
proposal279. As the Autonomy Act did not regulate the use of referendums on Åland the proposal 
had to be brought to the Supreme Court of Finland which later decided that the Regional Parliament 
had not exceeded its legislative authority by proposing the referendum.280 
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The Finnish membership treaty was confirmed by the EU member states on 24 June 1994 and the 
final stretch of the EU saga had been reached. It must also be noted that while the membership 
agreement was prepared Finland requested further financial support for the agricultural sector and 
for regional support to mitigate the immediate effects of access to the common market and 
increased competition from produces from other member states.281 These negotiations would also 
play a role in the Ålandic debate, especially from the perspective from the Centre Party which as an 
agrarian party has put special emphasis on the importance of this support for farmers on Åland. 
Right after the decision to hold a separate advisory referendum on Åland the parliament went into 
summer recess which meant that the next Government communication to the Regional Parliament 
would be in September.  
During the summer season on 19 August 1994, the newspaper Nya Åland had published an 
investigation of the positions held by the MP’s on the topic of membership in the European 
Union.282 According to the answers given by the individual MP’s283: the main point of contentions 
were the MEP question, taxation, agricultural policy and the lack of an alternative to EU 
membership.284 
 In terms of individual parties, the largest party in the chamber and the governing party, the Centre 
Party, was the most split among their MP’s. 6 of their 10 MP’s refused to take a clear position on 
deciding on EU membership, 2 said they would vote against membership under certain 
conditions285, 1 said he would vote No for Finland’s part and Yes for Åland due to the need for EU 
agricultural support and 1 stated that he had already decided in favour of membership during the 
EEA process.  
The Liberals (7 MPs), were more positive albeit with certain reservations, 3 MPs stated that they 
would vote in favour and 4 maintaining positivity with reservations.286 
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The conservative Frisinad Samverkan (FS)287 (6 MPs), were split but with a clearly positive 
leaning majority, 4 MPs stated that they were positive towards the European Union, 1 was not sure 
about his position and 1 maintained a no.288 
The Social Democrats (4 MPs) had all positive answers towards a membership.289 
Finally, the Unaligned Coalition (3 MPs) were all negative towards membership.290 
Based on the replies of the MPs it can be stated that the EU membership was considerably 
controversial both between and within political parties. This is notable as the interviews were 
conducted after the permanent derogations granted in the Åland Protocol. 
Before the reconvening of the Regional Parliament, the committee291 set for the exploration of the 
potential transfer of taxation authority for Åland in 1992 came out with its final report on 25 August 
1994. The report considered that taking over of taxation powers by Åland would expose the local 
economy to cyclical economic distress and that it could lead to Åland becoming a tax paradise. The 
two Ålandic representatives on the committee stated their reservation towards the decision and their 
indignation toward the usage of the term “tax paradise”.292 
The Regional Government sent their fourth message to the Regional Parliament on 7 September 
1994 which also refused to take a position on membership and preconditioned the consent of the 
Regional Parliament for a membership to a promise regarding the overtaking of all taxation 
authority and a seat in the European Parliament. Furthermore, the ongoing negotiations between 
Finland and the EU regarding regional policy and agricultural support were noted as an unresolved 
issue. In conclusion the Regional Government stated that it would send its fifth and final message in 
November.293 
During this week, the Finnish Supreme Court sent its decision on whether or not the Regional 
Government had exceeded its authority by preparing legislation on organizing a separate 
referendum on the island. The court considered that the Regional Parliament had not exceeded it 
authority according to the Autonomy Act. Following this this decision the President also sent his 
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approval of the regional law which ensured that Åland would vote on the 20 November.294 The date 
was a deliberate choice on the Regional Government’s side to ensure the Ålandic decision would be 
made after the result of the Swedish referendum on membership would be clear.295 
 The Regional Parliament then set the first debate about the Regional Government’s message on the 
date 14 September 1994 which began the first of the seven debates on EU membership in the Åland 
Parliament. 
5. The EU Debates and the Referendum Process. 
 
This section will provide a chronology of the debates from the closing session of the Regional 
Parliament in September 1994 to the final decision on membership on 2 December 1994. It will 
begin with a presentation of the first three debates that took place on 14 September, 21 September 
and 26 September. These are the debates that took place before the vote and were a part of the 
closing session of the 1993-1994 Regional Parliament term. Then, a separate section will be given 
to the reactions toward the vote to incorporate the Ålandic reaction to the results on Åland and 
Finland on 16 October. This is to provide a chronology of the political process and to contextualise 
the debates that took place afterwards. The debates after opening of the new session of the Regional 
Parliament on 1 November will be presented in a subchapter each. These took place on 11 
November, 17 November, 28 November and 2 December. 
5.1 The First Debate Before the Finnish Referendum (14.09) 
 
 
Figure 10: Headline regarding the first EU debate. “Brussels more generous towards us than 
Helsinki”296 
The first debate took place on 14 September 1994 and was discussion of the government report of 
the consequences of the EU membership for Åland and potentials alternatives to membership. It 
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was stressed by the Premier that the alternatives were hypothetical scenarios that would require 
further negotiation processes which could not be foreseen at the time. The parties appear to have 
similar positions to their answers to Nya Åland a month earlier.297 
The Centre Party group which also led the Government coalition remained somewhat ambiguous 
towards the prospect of EU membership. The Party Leader and Premier Erlandsson claimed that 
during the EU process Brussels had been “more generous” than Helsinki in terms of accepting 
Ålandic demands and that a non-membership scenario could create increased dependency towards 
Helsinki which was not a desirable situation. He stated that a separate MEP for Åland alongside a 
promise from Helsinki to expand taxation powers for the region were “threshold questions” in order 
to “maintain a positive outlook towards EU membership”. He stressed that the transfer of 
Legislative authority toward the EU organs gave the demand for a separate MEP legitimation.298 
Agriculture Minister Anders Eriksson emphasized that the EU’s Regional and Agricultural was the 
only way to “get money back” from the membership fee.299 Göran Bengtz, the parliamentary group 
leader also repeated the “threshold questions” and also expressed confidence that the EU would be 
able to accommodate a situation where Åland remained outside.300 Christer Jansson, MP expressed 
his displeasure of transferring legislative competences to the EU without getting compensation in 
return (i.e an MEP) and his fear of “Finnisation” in a scenario in which Sweden did join the union 
as the status of Swedish as an official language of the EU would be in doubt in that scenario.301 
The Liberals were represented by party leader Olof Erland and Folke Sjölund. They conditioned 
that the decision on EU membership for Åland was dependent on the actions of Finland and Sweden 
and maintained a positive outlook on membership in this case. They stressed the importance of the 
four freedoms of the EU for the Ålandic economy and that access to the EU markets would allow 
Åland to maintain a competitive trade policy. They maintained that a separate MEP for Åland was a 
justified demand. However, the Liberals were not convinced of increased taxation powers to Åland 
and stated that this was a matter between Åland and Finland. They also stressed the principles of the 
European peace process and the benefits of international cooperation as the backbone of European 
Integration. Erland also advocated a decentralised Nordic Union based on the EEA agreement in the 
scenario as an alternative to EU membership.302 
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The conservative FS was represented by K-G Eriksson, Max Siren, May Flodin and Harry Eriksson. 
The majority of the group spoke of the EU on economic terms and stressed the benefits of EU 
membership through the “four freedoms”. K-G Eriksson and Siren insisted that increased taxation 
powers for the region and a separate MEP were justified on the subsidiarity principle in the EU and 
Finland’s promise to expand Ålandic autonomy from the first autonomy act in 1920.303 Harry 
Erikson broke the party line by arguing that the transfer of legislative authority to a supranational 
authority was unacceptable in any situation and that the common market posed a threat to the local 
economy due to increased competition.304 May Flodin also addressed the EU from a gender 
perspective, agreeing with the Social Democrat Sundback that the EU’s equality directives were 
better than the legal arrangements in the Nordic countries although the de facto situation was better 
in the Nordic region. Flodin did also state that there were cultural differences between the “Catholic 
model” of housework for women as opposed to the “Lutheran model” which stressed the need for 
women to be more active in the job market but that the EU itself was not a hinder for women’s 
rights.305 
The only Social Democrat to speak in this session was Barbro Sundback who stressed the peace 
element of the European integration process and the benefits of a borderless Europe. Sundback also 
mentioned the economic benefits of the common market and the recognition of the defence 
mechanisms in the Åland protocol regarding the regional citizenship. Sunback emphasised that a 
non-membership scenario would cause economic difficulties for attracting investment and maintain 
welfare levels on Åland as the EEA agreement would no longer be valid. She criticised the 
members of parliament who “laid their souls” into obtaining taxation saying that there was no 
inherent connection with the EU process and increasing taxation authority. Sundback also viewed 
the EU’s gender equality directives and increased contacts outside of Åland as beneficial to Åland. 
She responded to Erland’s Nordic Union idea as unrealistic due to foreign policy differences 
between the Nordic countries.306 
The final group was the Unaligned Coalition represented by Bengt Häger who opposed EU 
membership on the grounds of his and his party’s opposition towards transferring authority to  a 
supranational organisation. Häger insisted that a special free trade agreement or some form of 
customs union would be a more suitable solution for Åland’s relation to the EU.307 
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5.2. The Second Debate Before the Finnish Referendum (21.09)  
 
This debate took place on 21 September 1994 and was a continuation of the first debate which 
discussed the consequences of membership or non-membership for Åland. The positioning of the 
parties were the same as the previous session, the Centre Party stressed the threshold questions, the 
Liberals maintained an ideologically positive attitude towards EU membership and the Social 
Democrats stressed that EU membership would not endanger the rights of workers. 
The Liberals were represented by Gunnevi Nordman, Edgar Abrahamsson and Gunnar Jannson. 
Nordman’s speech was a response to the previous debate’s theme on gender equality and the EU. 
She agreed with Sundback and Flodin on the fact that the EU’s equality directives were superior to 
the legislation in the Nordic region.308 Abrahamsson criticised the Centre Party and the Regional 
Government on not being able to negotiate a satisfactory deal on agriculture support and regional 
policy. He also accused them of using “political jargon” on “threshold question” and demanded that 
the Regional Government clarify if the MEP and taxation issues were actually preconditions for an 
Ålandic Yes to the EU.309 Gunnar Jansson likened the choice between membership and non-
membership as a “choice between a Volkswagen and a Wartburg” the implication being that 
choosing the west (i.e. membership) is better than the east (i.e. non-membership).310 
The Centre Party was represented by Olof Salmen, Tage Boman, Sture Gustafsson and Christer 
Janson. Salmen insisted that the MEP and taxation issues needed to be resolved by the time to 
decide on EU membership and blamed Helsinki for “wanting to control the Ålandic economy”. 
Salmen also insisted that the Åland Protocol was evidence that Brussel would be supportive of 
Åland expanding its taxation authority and that Finland should be ready to negotiate a non-
membership scenario for Åland should it be required.311 Tage Boman stated that he was 
overwhelmingly negative towards EU membership and repeated the party line on the “threshold 
questions”.312 Sture Gustafsson expressed his anxiety regarding agricultural policy and increased 
competition within the EU.313 Christer Jansson stated that he was positively inclined towards the 
EU but nevertheless expressed his worry of lowering life standards as a result of EU membership 
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and that obtaining the authority for indirect taxation could help combat the difficulties in trading 
that could arise as a result of the tax border that was included in the Åland Protocol.314 
The Social Democrats were represented by Britt Marie Lund, who stated the fears of privatisation 
and the reduction of the public sector was overdriven and there was no need of fear of losing the 
achieved social benefits or the collective agreements as a result of EU membership. She concluded 
by stating that the purpose of the EU was to establish peace, democracy and increase solidarity 
between the member states.315 
5.3 Third Debate Before the Finnish Referendum (26.09) 
 
This debate was final one before the vote on 16 October. It was also a continuation of the first two 
debates and the discussion revolved around the potential consequences of the referendum. 
The Centre Party participated with Premier Erlandsson, Christer Jansson, Göran Bengtz and 
Anders Eklund. The Primer’s speech focused on the international status of Åland. He stated that 
there was a significant difference of interpretation of the phrase “in consideration to the special 
status the Åland islands enjoy under international laws” between themselves and the Finnish 
authorities. Erlandsson stated that without this status the EU would hardly grant the derogations 
found in the Åland Protocol. For Åland he clarified that this international status consisted of three 
pillars which could not be separated from one another. Erlandsson explained that these were: 
Åland’s constitutional status, the autonomy arrangement, and the demilitarised and neutralised 
status of the islands. He stated that the Finnish side refrained from any mention on demilitarisation 
and insisted that the preamble only referred to the autonomy arrangement. The premier stated that 
he could not understand this attitude from Finland and claimed that the “Åland example” should be 
promoted as a peaceful solution towards minority conflicts.316  
Christer Jansson’s speech agreed with the Premier on Åland’s international status and focused on 
the realisation of the tax exemption. Jansson stated that if Finland insisted on integrating Åland into 
its tax region despite the derogation Åland could turn to certain EU institutions such as the 
European Court of Justice and the European Commission to realise this. He took a different 
approach from the majority of his party on the MEP issue by stating that it was not an essential 
matter and representation could be achieved through other means such as the Committee of 
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Regions. He also stressed the importance of the Finnish and Swedish referendum results for the 
Ålandic decision on EU membership.317 Göran Bengtz expressed his deep concern for the future of 
the agricultural section in an EU membership and stated he would vote No in the first referendum 
on 16 October.318Anders Eklund criticised the EU’s agricultural policy which he stated was the 
reason he would also vote no in the referendum on 16 October.319 
The Liberals were represented by party leader Olof Erland and Gunnar Jansson. Erland repeated 
the Liberal position of “if Sweden and Finland were to join the EU, so should Åland” and 
mentioned the benefits of the EU from the perspectives of peace, economy, democracy, and 
welfare.  He insisted that a separate MEP for Åland would mark Åland’s international status and 
would provide a useful political platform in the EU. He also stated that an exclusion scenario would 
cause uncertainty for Åland.320 Gunnar Jannson’s speech revolved around an emphasis on the 
economic benefits of EU membership that would allow Åland to maintain its welfare levels. He 
nevertheless stated some concern toward the Common Fisheries Policy and the Common 
Agricultural Policy in the EU.321 
The Unaligned Coalition participated with Bengt Häger and Bart Häggblom. Bengt Häger 
criticised Finland for not demanding opt-outs like Denmark did. He expressed his disappointment 
with EU regulations on agriculture, tax harmonisation and claimed that in practice the subsidiarity 
principle would end up being synonymous with subordination. Häger concluded by refer to the 
Fareoes precedent which got a 3-year transition period with association with the EU before deciding 
on membership.322 Häggblom gave a similarly EU critical speech, constructing an EU that was 
incompatible with the autonomy arrangement and governed by unaccountable bureaucrats. He 
stated that once a member, it would be practically impossible to the leave the EU unlike in the EEA 
arrangement. He also invoked the Faroese precedent and also claimed that demilitarisation of Åland 
had not been recognized since Finland had not asked for a derogation like Denmark. He stated that 
the EU only wanted the Nordics in to become net payers to the budget and complained about the 
lack of the “principle of public access to official records”323 in the EU.324 
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5.4 Reactions to the Results of the Finnish Referendum on 16 October 1994 
 
By the end of the month of September 1994, some of the parliamentary parties began discussing 
their final officials’ positions toward the referendum. In the meanwhile, the Regional Government 
visited the Finnish parliamentary party groups with the intention of convincing them to allocate 
Åland a separate MEP.325 
The Social Democrats held a meeting on the referendum on 26 September 1994 which resulted in a 
“clear majority in favour of membership” according to party leader Pekka Tuominen despite some 
opposing voices and no actual vote on the issue.326 
The conservative FS held its own meeting in the same week and recommended its members to vote 
Yes in the referendum on 16 October.327 
A week later the Liberals also recommended a Yes in the vote.328  
The Centre Party and the Unaligned Coalition did not formally take a position towards the 
referendum on 16 October.329 
The “convincing round” with the parties represented in the  in Helsinki for a separate MEP for 
Åland ended in failure “despite Åland’s constitutional right to a MEP” according to the Premier on 
6 October 1994.330With this failed round of negotiations it appears that despite the declaration of an 
Ålandic MEP and the overtaking of taxation authority as “basic preconditions” for maintain a 
positive attitude towards EU membership, these preconditions had not been met, at least in the 
context of the Finnish referendum. 
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Figure 11: The results on Åland in relation to Finland331 
The results on the evening of 16 October 1994 painted a markable different picture than on the 
Finnish mainland. Of the 18 752 registered voters, 11 483 voted which would mean a participation 
rate of 61,2 percent. The Yes votes totalled at 6.041 (51.9 percent) while the No votes gathered 
5.608 (48.1 percent). The difference was remarkable lower than in Finland as whole where the Yes 
side enjoyed a much more comfortable majority (57 percent to 43).332 
Another interesting element of the results was a clear Urban-Rural divide on the Åland Islands; of 
the 16 municipalities only two of them maintained a Yes majority, namely Mariehamn333(with 63,7 
percent in favour) and Lemland334(50,9 percent in favour).335 Considering the slim majority in 
Lemland, it would not be farfetched to claim that Mariehamn was the only district in Åland with 
any notable enthusiasm towards the prospects of EU membership. 
Premier Erlandsson stated to Ålandstidningen that he was surprised at the results and was expecting 
a triumph from the No side. He stated that he was expecting a larger Yes in the second referendum 
considering that the Producers Union336 were now recommending a Yes. He maintained that the 
insecurities regarding the future were still higher if Åland chose to remain outside the EU. 
 
331 Ålandstidningen 17 October 1994 
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333 The capital of the Åland Islands and its only town. 
334 The district immediately to the south of Mariehamn 
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336 Producentsförbund in Swedish, influencial organisation in the agricultural sector on Åland. Has a close relationship 
with the Center Party. It recommended a No in the first vote. 
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Erlandsson also stated that the influence in EU policy and taxation questions must be resolved 
before a Yes in the second referendum could be obtained. He stated that: “A massive Ålandic No 
due to a stepmotherly government would be harmful for Finland’s reputation. Finland wins 
internationally by following the spirit and intention of autonomy”. He also felt the need to state his 
disappointment at how the Nordic region “hopped on the EU train” and that it would have been 
better to have waited some years to see how the Maastrich treaty functioned in practice and have 
more time to reach a higher level of national unity.337 
The Speaker of the Regional Parliament, Roger Jansson338 stated that he was satisfied with the 
results of the referendum and that the results were good for country from an economic and defence 
policy perspective. He stated that the Ålandic debate had been notably more negative than the 
Finnish on grounds of the unresolved issues and influences from the Swedish debate. Jansson also 
said that so far there had not been a clear “Yes movement” on Åland and that “it was up to Helsinki 
to decide” when it was going to begin. Jansson stated that he was for membership on the condition 
that “Åland gets what belongs to Åland and that the autonomy does not get devalued by the 
state”.339 
The MP for Åland in the Finnish Parliament Gunnar Jansson, noted his concern over the urban-rural 
divide on the EU issue both in the region and the state as a whole.340 Two other Liberal MP’s were 
also available for comment at the evening of the results Sune Erikson and Olof Erland, leader of the 
party. 
Eriksson stated that the turnout in the referendum was a sign of voter interest towards the EU. He 
theorized that Lemland’s Yes depended on its proportion of commuters341which was higher than the 
farmers in the district. He stated that he did not believe that the second referendum would be much 
different than this one and noted that Finland as a sovereign state had taken a decision without 
looking towards Sweden.342 
Erland also stated that the bare majority in favour of membership pointed towards a deep division 
among the voters, especially between urban and rural regions. He also noted that all parties had Yes 
and No flanks. He argued that the bare majority increased the importance of the second referendum 
and that it was important to get a clear Yes result from it. Erland stated that with Finnish 
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membership the EEA agreement was now invalid and that a Nordic union outside the EU was also 
no longer realistic. He concluded by stating the importance of maintaining scattered settlements and 
a living countryside and archipelago in the EU.343 
Parallel to the referendum process, the so-called Jääskinen Committee, set up under the leadership 
of legal expert Niilo Jääsikinen gave its report to the Ministry of Justice on the inclusion of Ålandic 
representatives on EU policy at the state level.344 The result was unanimous agreement to amend the 
Autonomy Act to ensure Ålands participation in certain areas of EU policy making. These were:  
-One of Finland’s seats in the Committee of Regions 
-Input of Åland’s representative when the national position on EU policy is being formulated at the 
Parliament should the subject be considered within Åland’s authority or be considered of 
importance by the Regional Government 
-A permanent representative at the Finnish delegation in Brussels. 
-Granting the MP for Åland in the Parliament permanent access to the meetings of the Grand 
Committee345 
The changes were meet with great enthusiasm on the side of the Åland Government but the 
remaining “threshold questions” namely representation in the European Parliament and increased 
taxation authority to the region would still remain high on the agenda going forward. 
The most dramatic example of this was a speech given by the Speaker of Parliament, Roger Jansson 
in which he stated that by withholding a MEP from Åland, Finland was on its way towards a 
“constitutional crisis” if the state attempted to “downgrade the autonomy”. He stressed that the 
Åland parliament had also transferred a share of its legislative authority to the EU and hence 
required compensation. Jansson also included the possibility of Åland to seek external help visa vie 
the states which were involved in the 1921 resolution346 United Nations which “according to certain 
interpretations, could be considered the successor of the League of Nations”.347 
Developments regarding the application of the Tax exemption provisions were also quite 
discouraging, at least from the perspective of Ålandic politicians. The economic-political committee 
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of the Finnish Government stated that a tax border between Åland and Finland was not possible to 
achieve at the entrance to the European Union and that border practicalities should be avoided.348 
Both the Regional Government and MP for Åland, Gunnar Jansson stated their frustration with the 
decision and the later also state that going to the European Court of Justice was an option.349 
In this context Ålandstidningen interviewed 29 of the 30 legislators350 in the Regional Parliament 
on which way they would vote if they had to in the current situation.351 The results were as follows; 
Out of the 10 Centre Party MPs 4 were unclear, 3 were against and 3 were in favour. 
Out of the 7 Liberal MPs, 1 was unclear352 and 6 were in favour. 
Out of the 6 FS MPs. 2 were unclear, 1 was against and 3 were in favour 
Out of the 4 Social Democratic MPs, 1 was unclear353 and 3 were in favour 
Out of the 4 Unaligned Coalition MPs, all 4 were against. 
From these results it can be concluded that 17 MPs were ready to vote Yes, 7 were not and 6 were 
unclear. While this fell short of the 2/3 requirement (i.e. 20 MPs) to take the decision to join the 
EU, it seemed that the referendum results had pushed a certain number of MPs towards accepting 
membership. Most notable was that the Centre Party remained quite divided in its orientation 
towards the EU. 
The new regional parliamentary term was opened on 1 November 1994, Roger Jansson from FS 
was re-elected speaker of parliament and gave a speech on the topic of EU membership. He noted 
that the EU issue was simply “too large to achieve unity on” and that despite certain uncertainties 
regarding taxation, “sufficient representation” (i.e. a separate MEP) and “clarity” regarding 
demilitarisation there seemed to be “positive interpretations” regarding the these issues in the 
(Finnish) Parliament even if the Finnish Government was not expressing it. Jansson also stated that 
“After 77 years Finland should have the confidence to accept that its sovereignty over Åland will 
remain strongly limited.” He urged for a Yes vote in the referendum and claimed that a No option 
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could lead to greater dependency to decisions taken in Finland which he considered undesirable for 
the autonomy of Åland.354 
The Regional Government sent its final message to the Regional Parliament on 8 November 1994 in 
which it officially recommended the voters to vote Yes. The Regional Government had clearly 
admitted that it could not achieve a separate MEP for Åland even though it was satisfied at the level 
of participation at other levels. It also mentioned that it was of “definite opinion” that the easing of 
tax formalities as a result of Åland’s exclusion from the tax harmonisation should be applied not 
only to trade between Åland and Finland but also for trade with the other EU member-states. The 
Regional Government urged the Finnish Government to set a committee to change the Autonomy 
Act in order for Åland to receive authority in the field of company tax and indirect taxation which 
should also propose a time table for the whole transfer of taxation authority to the region. The 
Regional Government also stated that a special agreement with the EU would be needed if the 
“outside track” was selected and that they had contacted the Finnish delegation at the EU to inquire 
if Finland was prepared to negotiate one. Finally, on the topic of Åland leaving the EU, the 
Regional Government stated that the Ministry of Justice had stated that it was technically possible, 
provided that all the member states would consent to it. The Regional Government promised to 
“take measures” towards the unresolved issues before the referendum, which was only 12 days 
away.355   
5.5 Debate Before the Swedish Referendum (11.11) 
 
This debate took place after the fifth message on the EU by the Regional Government was sent on 8 
November 1994. The Regional Government finally took a position and recommended a Yes in the 
second referendum that would take place the week after. 
The Centre Party was represented by the Premier and Christer Jansson. The Premier Erlandsson 
began his speech by noting the change in paradigm in relation to the previous debates in that now 
the question was not about whether to join but rather on which conditions will Åland and Finland 
join the EU. He largely repeated the contents of the message sent on 8 November and concluded his 
speech by stating that a Yes would result in an orderly future while a No would cause 
uncertainty.356 
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Christer Jansson held a speech on the application of tax exemption granted in the Åland Protocol. 
He stated that the signals from Brussels were quite positive regarding formalities of the tax border 
however the Finnish side appeared to have more negative understanding of this.357 
The Liberals participated with Folke Sjölund. 
Sjölund stated that while the EU was no paradise, the alternative was much worse. He reminded that 
the EEA agreement would no longer apply at the turn of the year and that Åland did not have an 
alternative in place. He claimed that the Regional Government’s insistence on the taxation issue358 
was a stillborn attempt and that they should have focused on the realisation of the tax exemption 
status instead.359 
The conservative FS joined with K-G Eriksson, Max Siren, May Flodin and Harry Eriksson. 
K-G Eriksson recommended a Yes justified on their agreement with the Regional Government’s 
message and also stated his belief that the MEP issue and increasing the taxation authority would be 
resolved “positively”.360 However, Harry Eriksson maintained his sceptical stance on the EU 
claiming that there was a significant lack of information among the voters and expressed worry for 
the depopulation of the archipelago and countryside on Åland.361 May Flodin was ambiguous on the 
final vote and Max Siren spoken in favour of a yes vote. Siren also stated that he would do so even 
if Sweden voted against membership. Flodin stressed that the results of the second referendum on 
Åland would be morally binding despite it being an advisory referendum. She also expressed her 
scepticism towards lobbying in Brussel.362 Max Siren struck a slightly more positive tone stated that 
he believed that the EU was an organisation that was built for keeping peace, restoring the 
environment, and securing prosperity.363 
The Social Democrats had Barbro Sundback and party leader Pekka Tuominen as participants. 
Barbro Sundback reminded that she had previous stated that the MEP and taxation authority 
questions would not have been solved by membership, and that this had proven to be the case. She 
stated her belief that Ålandic membership in the EU would increase the room for negotiation in 
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several fields and that Åland’s influence at the state level would also increase compared to the 
current situation.364 
The leader of the party Pekka Tuominen stated that throughout this process, demilitarisation and 
restrictions regarding land acquisition were the two main points of concern for the party and both 
had been dealt with in a satisfactory manner. He claimed that the current state of affairs justified the 
Social Democratic scepticism towards a separate referendum and sent his thanks to the MPs that 
had supported their proposal in June. He concluded by stating that the party would not issue a 
recommendation for how to vote in the referendum but that “It is important to go out and vote”.365 
Bengt Häger from the Unaligned Coalition stated his displeasure with the Regional Government’s 
inability to provide a real alternative to EU membership. He also claimed that: “I heard in the 
countryside that they say they feel misplaced to sing the line ‘the freedom of inheritance we 
carry’366 in the Song of the Ålander”. Häger stated that with EU membership Åland would 
practically surrender all of its decision-making power.367 
 
Figure 12: Headline regarding the results of the Swedish Referendum on 13 November 
1994368369 
The Swedish referendum took place on 13 November 1994 and resulted in a slim majority (52.2) in 
favour of membership.370This meant now that Åland’s referendum and the consequent decision on 
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EU membership would be taken in the knowledge that both of its immediate neighbours would join 
the union. 
5.6 Debate Before the Ålandic Referendum (17.11) 
 
The last debate before the separate referendum on Åland took place on 17 November 1994. 
The Centre Party participated in this debate with Göran Bengtz and Christer Jansson. 
The debate began with a group speech from Göran Bengtz. He stated that although Sweden’s Yes 
vote made it easier for Åland to join, there were still problems regarding the Common Agricultural 
Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy within the EU he declared that “farmers are serfs in the 
EU”. He also said that he would personally vote No despite his belief that the Yes side would win 
the final vote. Bengtz stated the Centre Party would not have an official position towards 
membership neither at the referendum or during the final parliamentary vote on 2 December. On the 
two former “threshold questions” (i.e. the MEP and increased taxation authority) he stated that a 
separate MEP for Åland should be pursued “with thought about the autonomy our forefathers gave 
us to administer”371 and that the demand was based on the fact that every legislative organ in the EU 
had been compensated for their transfer of authority to EU organs. He also expressed his confidence 
that the EU would be helpful for Åland to achieve greater taxation powers with consideration on 
their acceptance of the tax exemption, something which the Finnish authorities had not been as 
accepting of. Despite not being in favour of EU membership he still recognized that Brussels were 
more willing to acknowledge Åland demilitarised status than Finland was willing to.372 
Christer Jansson gave a speech which departed from his party line (or rather lack thereof) in which 
he stated that, despite the ongoing issues with the tax exemption, he was personally in favour of 
membership. He qualified this statement by claiming that EU membership was “the most important 
development in terms of nationality protection since Åland was separated from the Swedish realm 
in 1809”, that it was “important to maintain the same trade relations with Sweden as with Finland” 
and that this aspect was crucial in maintaining Åland as a monolingual Swedish speaking province 
was going forward.373 
The Liberals participated with leader Olof Erland and Gunnar Jansson. 
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Olof Erland began his speech by claiming that Åland was now in the “third important epoch” in the 
history of autonomy. He stated that the first stage was the birth of autonomy, the second stage was 
participation in Nordic cooperation process and the third stage was the European integration process 
since 1989. He reminded the Helsinki-critical voices that Åland had got it’s said during this process 
and perhaps the persistence of “ill will and ignorance” towards Åland from Finland was of Ålands 
own doing. He summarized the Liberal position as “Voting Yes even if the price is high”. On the 
MEP issue he stated that the argument base on the transfer of legislative powers were insufficient 
and the real legitimisation of a separate MEP came from the fact that the Ålanders were a separate 
people with a separate party system. He stated that they were not interested in one of Finland’s 
MEP’s but rather a separate MEP for Åland it. Erland concluded by hoping for a Yes and a large 
turnout in the referendum on Sunday.374 
Gunnar Jansson gave a colourful and long speech on the benefits of EU membership, he especially 
stressed that the difference between internal and foreign affairs within the union would be blurred 
which would give Åland an opportunity to express its own viewpoints and demilitarisation. Jansson 
stated that this blurring of the internal and external in the EU would “dramatically increase” the 
foreign policy capabilities of Åland because foreign policy will not be subordinate to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs or that it would not function at all, as in the Nordic Council.375  
The Unaligned were represented in this session with Bert Häggblom. Bert Häggblom held a speech 
in which he insisted that the insecurities of EU membership are still higher than remaining outside. 
He expressed his concern for the whole population of Åland especially the farmers, the fishers and 
the rural communities. He stated his belief that due to increased urbanisation, “Åland will have a 
large head but no body” with Mariehamn being the dominant region while the countryside and 
archipelago consistently depopulate. Häggblom also insisted that the alternative to EU membership 
could be found in continued association with the EEA provided that the EU and Finland could agree 
on it.376 
The separate referendum on Åland took place that Sunday on 20 November 1994, a week after the 
Swedish referendum and a week before the Norwegian referendum. The idea was to have a 
“domino effect” within the Nordic region to ensure that the most EU-positive country (Finland) 
vote first and the most EU-sceptic country (Norway) to vote last.377It seems that the political 
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leadership on Åland were aware of this strategy which accurately predicted the decreasing 
enthusiasm towards the EU among the east-west axis in the Nordic region378 but still failed to 
convince the Norwegian voters which ultimately voted to remain outside the union. 
 
Figure 13: Headline regarding the Ålandic Referendum on 20 November 1994379 
18 090 persons on Åland were registered to vote in the second referendum and of that number 8 878 
persons decided to vote meaning the turnout was 49.1 percent. The total amount of Yes votes 
totalled at 6 456 which corresponded to (73.6 percent) and the No votes totalled at 2 311 (26.4 
percent).380Despite the overwhelming proportion of Yes votes, which were a majority in every 
district on Åland, the significantly lower turnout can be interpreted as lack of motivation to vote 
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again among the no side and the undecided. Interestingly, the number of Yes votes increased by 415 
from 6 041 in the previous referendum.381 
The first immediate consequence of the referendum results was the decision of the Centre Party to 
vote in favour of EU membership in the final vote which was to take place on 2 December, joining 
the Liberals, Social Democrats and FS.382Harry Eriksson from FS still insisted against the party line 
that he would vote against membership and all 3 MP’s from the Unaligned Coalition also 
maintained their positions against membership.383This meant that the Regional Parliament now had 
a qualified majority (26 votes) in favour of membership which was required for the decision. 
5.7 Debate After the Ålandic Referendum (28.11) 
 
This committee report was sent to the parliament for debate and was debated over on 28 November 
1994. The debate began with committee chairperson Sune Eriksson’s expression of gratitude for the 
No-side in the referendum process for “deepening the debate” and stated that the “critical yes” 
result from the referendum results should not be forgotten during Åland’s participation in the 
European Union. His speech consisted of the committee proposals for the final statement the 
Regional Parliament would attach to its declaration on the decision to join the EU.384  
The Centre Party participated with Göran Bengts, and Christer Jansson 
Göran Bengts spoke on behalf of the Centre Party and stated. He stated his support for the 
committee statement on the MEP issue as Åland had transferred some of its legislative power to the 
EU and should be compensated for it. Bengtz stated that it was gladdening to see that both the Yes 
and the No sides based their arguments in the defending and developing the base of autonomy. He 
ended on a positive note by stating that EU membership had the benefits of increased recognition 
for the autonomy arrangement, demilitarisation, and expansion of international law.385 
Christer Jansson from the Centre Party expressed his concern regarding the application of the tax 
exemption and stated that the tax exemption could not be dealt with by unilateral legislation on 
Finland’s side as the Åland Protocol was a part of EU primary law. He also proposed collaboration 
with Swedish and EU officials to ensure the enforcement of the regulation.386 
 
381 Ibid. 
382 Nya Åland 22 November 1994 
383 Ibid. 
384 Ålands Lagting 28 November 1994, pp. 290-293 
385 Id. pp. 293-295 
386 Id. pp. 301-303. 
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The Liberals participated with Olof Erland 
Erland stated that they would vote Yes in the vote on Friday387 but that it would be a “critical Yes”. 
He noted the difference in interpretation of demilitarisation between Åland and Finland but also 
claimed that the EU also wanted to avoid potential hinders for defence cooperation in the future388. 
Erland insisted that the Regional Parliament should insist on its demand for an MEP based on the 
idea of an “Ålandic people” as separate entity since Åland was joining the union on its own terms 
and not “just as Finnish citizens”. He expressed his hope that the cooperation of Nordic parliament 
within the framework of the EU could help introduce the “principle of public access to official 
records”389  into the EU which was “foreign” to many EU member states. Erland also proposed 
making Åland into a permanent meeting place for Nordic meetings on EU issues and that a congress 
house could be built for the occasion.390 
From the conservative FS group, K-G Eriksson, Max Siren and Harry Erikson gave speeches.  
K G Eriksson stated that the large majority of their group were in favour of membership, but they 
could not convince Harry Eriksson due to his “strong personal convictions”. He stated that it felt 
good that Åland was on its way to the EU with Finland and they would need to work towards 
solving the issues that remain.391 
From the same party Max Siren continued by stating that it was important to join the union despite 
the unresolved issues. He clarified by stating them as the MEP question and the application of the 
tax exemption.392. He stated that this reluctance from the Finnish side to apply the tax exemption 
could result in Finland’s EU journey “beginning in court”393.394 
A dissenting voice from the FS group Harry Eriksson insisted that “No true islander would accept 
being ruled by directive from far away” and that his No vote should be considered a protest against 
a lack of alternative of membership. He stated his belief that the lack of alternatives was the reason 
of low turnout in the second referendum and that “The disappointment among the people of the 
entire Nordic region will be large when the inevitable austerity packages start coming despite EU-
 
387 That is 2 December 1994 
388 Hence the phrasing regarding “the status the Åland islands enjoy under international law” see section 3 
389 Offentlighetsprincipen in Swedish. 
390 Id. pp. 295-298. 
391 Id. pp. 298-300. 
392 The proposed law would incorporate Åland into the same tax region as mainland Finland, hence disallowing tax-
free sales between Åland and Finland. See Fagerlund 1997, p.200. 
393 This was a clear threat to apply to the European Court of Justice on grounds of Finland violating the Åland Protocol. 
394 Id. pp. 300-302. 
72 
 
membership”. Additionally, he claimed that the treatment of animals within the EU region was 
“uncivilised”.395 
Finally, another notable opponent to EU membership, Bert Häggblom from the Unaligned 
Coalition gave a speech where he expressed his regret over Åland “losing” a significant part of its 
authority to “another forum”. Häggblom went on to claim that the Åland Protocol could be 
expanded to incorporate the language of the “Sami Protocol”396which clearly refers to their 
“exclusive rights to reindeer husbandry within the Sami territory” and that the protocol could be 
expanded in relation to developments regarding their “traditional means of livelihood”. He also 
complained about the presence of lobbyists by stating that Denmark had fewer representatives in 
Brussels than the Italian automobile producer Fiat. Contrary to the overall tone of his speech, he 
also stated that “The EU had never treated small island societies poorly, even if they chose to stay 
outside”397. He concluded by stated that Ålandic politicians were “all too eager to make EU-
adjustments” that they “forgot to develop the autonomy” which he considered to be of the highest 
importance.398 
On the same evening as this debate, the Norwegian voters also went to the polls to decide on EU 
membership. The results were 52,5 percent against membership and 47,5 percent against. 
 
Figure 14: Headline regarding the results of the Norwegian EU Referendum399 
Among the first to react to the Norwegian results on Åland was speaker Roger Jansson (FS) who 
stated that the Norway’s No would weaken the Nordic voice in the EU and this in turn make the 
introduction of the principles that the Nordic region wants to introduce (to the EU) “more weakly 
 
395 Id. pp. 304-305. 
396 Protocol No. 3 in the Finnish Membership Treaty see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/SL/TXT/?uri=CELEX:11994N/PRO/03  
397 This is a clear reference to special arrangements done with Greenland, the Faroe Islands, the Isle of Man among 
others. 
398 Ålands Lagting, 28 Novbember 1994, pp. 306-307. 
399 Ålandstidningen 29 November 1994. ”The voice of the Nordic region becomes weaker in the EU” 
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advanced”. Jansson also stated that Nordic cooperation was “essential” to and there was a risk that 
Finland and Sweden joining the EU (without Norway) could weaken it.400 
May Flodin, also from the same party emphasized that the Norwegians emphasized “their right to 
decide from themselves” and speculated that perhaps they could afford it on a different capacity 
than Finland or Sweden due to a better economy. She stated her belief that the Nordic passport 
union and the common labour market could be maintained in the EU but predicted that the Nordic 
Cooperation would be more focused on cultural and regional policy.401 
The leader of Utanför EU (Outside EU) movement and the Unaligned Coalition, Bengt Häger 
expressed his opinions on the results by stating that although it was a shame that the Nordic region 
was split, the Norwegians showed that “they want to stand on their own feet”.402 
5.8 The Final Debate Before the Decision on EU-Membership (02.12) 
 
The Regional Parliament convened on 2 December 1994 to give its final decision on EU 
membership. The vote was held after the referendums in the Nordic region, in which Åland voted 
twice in favour of membership and all parliamentary groups except one declared that they would be 
voting Yes. This made the final debate the shortest during this process and the final vote was less 
dramatic than what could be expected from the pre-first referendum debates and the split results in 
the first vote. 
The Unaligned Coalition had Bengt Häger, Bart Häggblom and Jan Lillehage 
The debate began with a speech from Bengt Häger, from the Unaligned Coalition. He began by 
stating that: “The decision we stand before today is certainly one of the largest that has been taken 
in this house and with the largest and most uncertain results for the province of Åland”. He took a 
comparative approach to the reactions to the recent votes on the EU in the Nordic region by 
claiming that after a Yes result in Finland, Nokia had decided to “move 2000-3000 jobs to Texas” 
and that in Sweden interest rates increased while the value of the national currency decreased. He 
contrasted this with the Norwegian No vote resulting in decreased interest rates and increased value 
of the currency. He lamented the split in the Nordic region on the EU issue. He also questioned the 
future of Nordic cooperation considering that “Carl Bildt goes out and wants to scrap it” Häger 
stated that it was “practically impossible” to leave the EU as it would require a unanimous decision 
 
400 Ibid. 
401 Ibid. 
402 Ibid. 
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by the member states. He also stated that he could not understand the serving of champagne in the 
Regional Parliament after the decision since “it felt like salt in a wound”.403 
Jan Lillehage gave a very short speech acknowledging his relative silence during the EU process 
and his worry over the potential dangers of the increased bureaucracy of the trade between Åland 
and Finland as a result of the application of the tax exemption. He said that he was now convinced 
that the tax exemption without the transferring of full taxation authority to Åland was only a 
disadvantage. Using colourful rhetoric, he proposed that: “…for God’s sake take away the tax 
exemption until we have got our own taxation authority”.404  
Bert Häggblom, gave a final anti-EU speech in before the vote. He was strongly against the tax 
exemption granted within the Åland Protocol which he argued would create a border against 
Sweden which was something he could never accept. He went as far as to claim that an EU 
membership without the protocol would be more beneficial than a membership that was negotiated. 
Häggblom also insisted that “The Nordic region is something that is needed for the rest of Europe” 
and that the EU wanted the Nordics to strengthen the EU and “pay the bill” for keeping the weaker 
countries in the union. He also stated that the No side was now waiting on Spain to reject the 
membership applications of Austria, Finland and Sweden405.406 
Also coming from an EU critical perspective FS’s Harry Eriksson held a short speech in which he 
claimed that the main reason many were in favour of membership was to maintain the special status 
of Åland by a “less ugly authority”.407. He claimed that the Yes side had bluffed about there only 
being “one train to Brussels” in the EU process but that the Norwegian vote had called that bluff. 
He said that while Åland was not an independent state, he considered that “We have the same right 
to stand our ground”. He concluded by pleading to the MP’s to vote “according to their 
conscience”.408 
The Liberal speakers in this session were once again Olof Erland and Gunnar Jansson. Olof Erland 
stated that EU membership will give Ålandic politics a new dimension. He mentioned that despite 
its small size Åland was “principally and constitutionally” a people in itself among the peoples of 
 
403 Ålands Lagting, 2 December 1994. pp. 327-328. 
404 Id. p. 331 
405 Due to EU rules, every Member State has to approve for new members to be accepted in the union. Spain was set 
to vote on 28 December 1994. 
406 Id, pp. 341-342. 
407 I.e. the European Union in relation to the Finnish state. 
408 Id. p. 330. 
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Europe, “The Ålandic people”.  Erland stated the EU aimed for peace and cooperation and was 
striving for a free market to secure welfare and give individuals opportunities.409 
Gunnar Jansson repeated his previous claims that the difference between domestic and foreign 
policy would be blurred and this would be beneficial to “strengthen the autonomy”. He also 
mentioned the MEP question by praising the Legal Affairs committee’s statement on ensuring the 
influence of Åland in the European Parliament which he considered to be an avenue for increasing 
the foreign policy competences for the people of Åland. He said that this decision was “the largest 
decision we have made” and that he had already said Yes once but he would do it again “with joy 
and not without pride” today as well.410 
At the end of the session the Regional Parliament decided to give its consent to EU membership in a 
26 to 4 vote putting an end to the Ålandic membership process and ensuring membership from 1 
January 1995.411 
 
Figure 15: Speaker Roger Jansson signs the declaration by the Regional Parliament to be sent 
to the Finnish President.412 
 
 
409 Id. pp. 330-331. 
410 Id. p.332-339 
411 Ibid. 3 MPs from Unaligned Coalition insisted on registering their reservations to the accepted declaration. Harry 
Eriksson, the other No-voter did not do the same. 
412 Ålandstidningen 2 December 1994. 
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5.9 Results 
 
 
Figure 16: Waever’s Layered Framework Visualized413 
This subsection will serve as an application to of the theoretical framework of the thesis to 
referendum process described in the previous subsections. Waever’s theory begins the analysis from 
the proposed European policy (Level 3) and working backward to the understandings of Europe and 
the EU (Level 2) which also grants access to the actor’s understands of the people and autonomy 
(Level 1). 
Using the final votes on 2 December 1994 as starting point we can discern the differences among 
and within the parties on their final positions on membership. At this stage of European policy 
Level 3, we find that the Centre, the FS (excluding Harry Eriksson), the Liberals and the Social 
Democrats voted in favour of EU membership while Harry Eriksson and the Unaligned Coalition 
voted against. 
Starting with the largest party in the Regional Parliament we can then go to Level 2 that is a 
conceptual understanding of Europe. For the Centre Party Europe’s association with the common 
agricultural policy of the EU, increased urbanisation and centralisation provided a threat to the rural 
communities and farmers they set out to represent. However, the EU’s derogations through the 
Åland Protocol and the statement regarding the international status of Åland allowed the party 
 
413 See section 2. 
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leader and Primer to imply that Brussels could be more understanding of the conditions on Åland 
than Helsinki could. The party also adjusted its positioning according the results of the referendums 
on Åland, Finland and Sweden fully acknowledging that the near environment had an important 
role to play for Åland’s service-based economy. The lack of an alternative to membership also 
seems to have affected the party’s final position as the EEA agreement would no longer be valid on 
Åland in an exclusion scenario which would endanger access to the common market and the 
freedom of movement to and from Åland.  At Level 1 the Centre Party understood of Åland as an 
autonomous region with an international legal status which required recognition. It stressed the 
expansion of autonomy and attempted to use the EU process to increase the taxation powers for 
Åland. It did not state many identitarian objections towards the EU apart from Christer Jansson who 
at times stressed a danger of “Finnisation” in case Åland joins the EU without Sweden. This view 
assumed that Finland would not introduce Swedish as an official language to the EU and is more 
suspicious of Finland than of the EU. They did not explicitly propose an alternative for membership 
but stated that it could have been arranged provided that the EU and Finland were willing to 
negotiate. 
 The FS maintained a qualified positivity towards the EU at Level 2 they primarily stressed the 
importance of the “four freedoms” for the economy of Åland and the importance of international 
cooperation in Europe. They saw no inherent contradiction with the European integration process 
and the autonomy arrangement on the contrary the majority of their MP’s claimed that the 
subsidiarity principle in the EU would help Åland in expanding its own taxation authority. They 
viewed the EU organs such the European Court of Justice and the European Commission as 
potential allies in case they could not get their demands through to Finland. May Flodin also praised 
the EU’s equality directives on gender relation.  On Level 1 they insisted on Finland’s obligation 
towards Åland in expanding Åland’s autonomy as much as possible. The only identitarian objection 
came from Harry Eriksson who broke the party line and vote No in the final vote. He claimed that 
the supranational character of the EU was inherently negative and transferring authority to it was 
not acceptable, he also emphasized that islanders had a distaste for “rule from afar”. This party did 
not propose an alternative to EU membership. 
The Social Democrats had a defensive positivity towards the EU and at Level 2 and stated that EU 
membership would create the economic preconditions to maintain the established welfare levels. 
They stressed international cooperation in Europe, the benefits of the common market and the 
positive role the EU played in post war Europe. Barbro Sundback stressed the value of the EU 
directives on gender equality. On Level 1 they were much more reserved than the other parties and 
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did not connect the EU process with the expansion of legal authority for Åland. Prior to the 
referendum process they had opposed holding a separate referendum altogether. They also did not 
express any concern regarding urbanisation, centralisation or any identity-based anxiety during the 
process. The Social Democrats did not propose an alternative to membership. 
The Liberals maintained an ideological positivity at Level 2 stating that EU membership was 
positive on four fronts: Welfare, Democracy, Peace and the Economy. They stressed that access to 
the common market was necessary to maintain welfare levels on Åland and that the EU was 
established to maintain democracy and peace in Europe. However, they did qualify their position by 
stated that it depended on the Finnish and Swedish decision on the EU membership. They were very 
positive towards the idea of internationalisation and this was connected to their ideas on Level 1 
which saw Åland as region that is dependent on and benefits from internationalisation. They 
insisted that the Ålanders were a separate people within the framework of the European Union and 
therefore was worthy of a MEP on its own. They did not view the EU process as a mean pressure 
Finland into increasing the taxation authority for the region. They proposed an alternative Nordic 
Union which would associate with the EU on the basis of the EEA agreement, provided that Finland 
and Sweden did not join. 
The Unaligned Coalition maintained its negativity towards the EU at Level 2 by portraying the 
European Union and its institutions as an unaccountable and undemocratic supranational structure 
that was culturally and politically incompatible with Level 1 that was the commitment to autonomy 
and expanding it as much as possible. For this group the EU also posed a threat regarding 
urbanisation and centralisation, an internal process already occurring on Åland which according to 
them would only worsen the trends. They were the only parliamentary group to uniformly oppose 
EU membership. They proposed remaining in the EEA agreement as an alternative. 
6. Discussion: Åland and the EU in 1994. 
 
Åland’s situation as “more than a province but less than a state” makes it notably more complicated 
to analyse the Ålandic conceptualisations of the EU without referring to the region’s political and 
economic dependency on Finland and Sweden. Additionally, the identification with the rest of the 
Nordic region is also significant albeit less immediate than with Sweden and Finland. 
 The EU’s lack of engagement with non-nation state entities forces the analyst to take in to account 
the relations between the region and the state. This is not to say there are not ontological 
understandings of the EU “as such” regarding the telos of the organisation independent of Åland’s 
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relation to Finland. To take account of and distinguish between these levels of discourse a multi-
level approach will be proposed. This schema is constructed as follows: 
1-Arguments regarding the telos of the EU as an organisation 
2-Arguments regarding the relation of the Nordic Region to the EU 
3-Arguments regarding the Åland-Finland-Sweden axis in relation to the EU 
6.1 Arguments Regarding the Telos of the EU 
 
This section will focus on the discourses based upon how the European Union as an organisation 
has been understood in this period by the MP’s of Åland.  
In the first debate on the EU question, the Primer Erlandsson stated that their goal from the 
beginning had been to “participate in the development of the common market with derogations”414.  
While he maintained his positivity towards the EU as an economic organisation, he acknowledged 
that the pressures of European integration had certain threatening aspects to the local economy. It 
should be noted that the EU had accepted almost all of the demands put forward by the Regional 
Government, including a last minute statement of “Åland’s international status” which made it 
possible for the Primer to conclude that perhaps “Brussels could afford to be more generous than 
Helsinki”.415 
However, fears due to the common agricultural policy of the EU would still be a divisive power 
among his own party the Centre Party, the traditional representative of the farmers and countryside. 
As the results of the first referendum show, the urban-rural divide was a real political phenomenon 
on Åland as with Finland and Sweden. The MP’s of this party consistently maintained that the 
common market and the common agricultural policy constituted threats to the Ålandic farming 
sector due to increased competition and centralisation in the EU. Another fear was the transfer of 
legislative authority of to a supra national organisation, which was and still is a major concern in the 
Nordic region. The members of this party exclusively stressed the EU as an economic institution 
rather than a political union. The idea of a “peace project” was totally absent in their argumentation. 
The Centre party was also the most split of the parties and did not officially take a position until the 
results of the second referendum on Åland. 
 
414 Lagtinget 14 Semtember 1994.p.43 
415 Ibid. 
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The conservative FS party, also a member of the Erlandsson Government, had maintained a largely 
positive outlook on the EU based on the argumentation on access towards the “four freedoms” and 
that the EU as an organisation was based on the idea of creating a peaceful Europe through 
economic integration. They emphasised the “subsidiarity principle” of the EU as evidence that the 
EU would have understanding towards the local conditions on Åland, which according to some 
members of the party was to expand taxation authority on Åland. Only one of their MPs, Harry 
Eriksson insisted that the EU was a centralising force which could not be reconciled to the 
autonomy arrangement. Eriksson’s perspective was more in line with the Unaligned Coalition 
whose main argument was that transferring legislative authority to the EU was undesirable in any 
case. 
The third coalition partner in the government were the Social Democrats. From the first debate they 
framed the purpose of the EU to create a Europe which would no longer go to war. They had also 
stated that it would be beneficial to join the Common Market to maintain economic prosperity 
needed to maintain welfare levels on Åland. They were also content with the Åland Protocol which 
recognized the “defence mechanisms” such as the Regional Citizenship416 and the exclusion of 
Åland from the tax harmonisation process in the European Union. In a somewhat defensive manner, 
they also ensured their voters that labour relations (i.e. collective agreements) would not be 
worsened in the EU and privatisation of public services were not obligatory within the union. 
On the opposition side the Liberals had always maintained positivity towards the EU “on the 
condition that Sweden and Finland join”. Despite this statement conditioning their attitude to the 
decision on the Sweden-Åland-Finland axis, the content of speeches indicate an overwhelming 
positivity on the organisation of the European Union. In several speeches analysed above Liberal 
MPs emphasized the importance of the EU on four points: Peace, Economy, Democracy and 
Welfare. They also acknowledged that the EU’s founding principle was to establish peace on the 
continent. From the economic perspective they emphasized the “four freedoms” and the strength of 
the EU as a trade block on the global scale. On democracy they focused on the diversity in the 
union and the rule of law. Finally, on welfare they stated that all though the Nordic countries were 
at a higher level of welfare, they could still push for improvement of union-wide welfare. 
The final party, Unaligned Coalition, while otherwise non-committal to a fixed party program, were 
the only clear anti-EU party during this process. They drove a sovereigntist argument against the 
EU stating time and again that transferring legislative authority to the EU would essentially make 
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Åland’s autonomy redundant. They put forward a centralised and anti-democratic EU which was 
not compatible with the Åland arrangement. They also stressed that the EEA agreement was 
preferable to EU membership since leaving the EEA agreement was significantly easier while 
leaving the EU required a unanimous decision by the member states. They did not criticise the 
Common Market as such (and had vote in favour of EEA membership earlier) but it appears that the 
political integration was the main point of contention for the party. Despite their overall negativity 
on the European Integration process the party emphasized their belief that the EU had 
understanding towards small island communities that chose to remain outside the union citing the 
the other two Nordic autonomies (i.e. the Fareoe Islands and Greenland) and certain British isles 
(e.g. Isle of Man, Guernsey etc.)  as examples. 
For the pro membership side of the debate, even among the split Centre Party, the idea that the EU 
could provide an expansion of an increased “room for manoeuvre” indicates a perception of the EU 
as a forum for new paradiplomatic activity. This was evident from the very first debate on 14 
September 1994 and maintained its prevalence throughout the process. Especially regarding the 
realisation of the tax exemption, the European Court of Justice was considered as a possible tool to 
pressure Finland into applying it. 
6.2. Discourses regarding the Nordic Region  
  
The 1990’s have been considered a turning point for the development of the official organs of 
Nordic Cooperation.417This was acknowledged by the Nordic Council meetings that took place in 
Mariehamn in 1991 and resulted in the Mariehamn declaration in 1991 and the Bornholm 
declaration in 1992. These declarations are important as they openly address the relationship of the 
formal Nordic Cooperation to the accelerated European Integration process at the time. However it 
they have not been able to renew interest on the side of Nordic Cooperation but the rather served as 
an anticipation of the Nordic decisions on EU membership in 1994.418 It appears that the idea and 
practice of the Nordic region as a coherent unit also struggled for relevance in the Ålandic EU 
debate.  
All the parties in the Regional Parliament were positively inclined toward increased Nordic 
Cooperation. As mentioned in section 3 Ålandic membership in the Nordic Council has been 
 
417 See Miles 1996 and Strang 2015 
418 Olesen & Strang 2015, pp. 33-34. 
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considered a milestone in the external relations of Åland. This point was especially emphasized by 
Liberal MPs, Olof Erland and Gunnar Jansson. 
Throughout the debate the Nordic region appears as a somewhat more intimate community of states 
and regions in relation to the European Union. However there appears to be no belief in the 
actuality of further integration within the context of official Nordic cooperation. The European 
Union appears as a larger and more significant form of cooperation despite certain misgivings 
regarding the Union and its member states.  
In the earlier debates Olof Erland presents a hypothetical “Nordic Union” which would be an 
alternative to EU based on cooperation on the EEA treaty. However, he insists that this would have 
“minimal supranational structure” and would be decentralised. Interestingly he does not elaborate if 
Denmark, already an EU member state at that point, would be a part of this “Nordic Union” by 
leaving the EU.  
Barbro Sundback from the Social Democrats had emphasized the overlap of Nordic Cooperation 
and the European integration process and that Nordic Cooperation would probably take place under 
the EU umbrella. She viewed a “Nordic Union” an impossibility on the basis of lack of a common 
foreign policy.  
The topic of gender equality was also brought about by some MPs in the Regional Parliament. It 
was nearly exclusively discussed by the Women represented in the parliament and the discussion 
revolved around the legal framework regarding (i.e. de jure) equality against the actual gains (i.e. de 
facto) made in terms of participation rates in the labour market and in political representation in the 
respective legislative organs. This topic had been brought to discussion by Social Democrat Barbro 
Sundback and further discussed by the Deputy Primer May Flodin (FS) and Deputy Speaker 
Gunnevi Nordman (Liberal). They all agreed about the Nordic region being de facto more 
progressive than the rest of Europe however also noted that the EU’s equality directives are de jure 
more stringent than that of the Nordic region.  It must be noted that a strong identification of the 
“Swedish model” of gender relations was present even if the applicability of that idea to the context 
of Åland of the time is problematic, this problem was highlighted by Sundback. 
The Centre Party and Unaligned MP’s did not pay any notable attention to this topic in their 
speeches, which may be due to their total lack of female MPs. It must also be noted that the gender 
balance of the Regional parliament at the time was 26 men to 4 women. Of those 4 women 2 
belonged to the Social Democrats, 1 to the Liberals and 1 to the conservative FS.  
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It is noteworthy to see within May Flodin’s speech on the topic a construction of the “Lutheran 
tradition” of gender relations in which the women of the household are expected to work for their 
livelihoods as opposed to the “Catholic tradition” which expected women to stay at home. As her 
speech did not refer to the theological grounds for the differentiation of gender relations it can be 
assumed that this was a cultural argument which points out a difference between the “Catholic 
south” and the “Protestant north”.  
Another theme regarding the discourse of the Nordic region was idea of the region as a zone of 
wealth and welfare. This view was mainly propagated by the Unaligned group and Harry Eriksson 
of FS. The main argument with this was that the EU’s intent with taking the Nordics into 
membership was to increase the number of net payers in the union to alleviate the economic 
hardships of the poorer south. The pro-EU camp i.e. the Liberals, Social Democrats and FS were on 
the defensive on the issue by insisting that membership of the EU provided a the conditions to 
sustain a functioning welfare system and that social welfare was not a competence of the EU.  
The idea of the “principle of public access to official records”419in Sweden and Finland was also 
contrasted to the EU as secretive organisation under the influence of lobbyists. The parties for EU 
membership lamented this situation while also expressing hope that the Nordics would be an 
influence for increased transparency and democracy. The idea the Nordics could act as a 
progressive force within the EU was mainly put forward by the Social Democrats and Liberals. 
In terms of discussing other Nordic autonomies, the Faroe Islands were the most prominently 
discussed by the Unaligned coalition members as evidence that the EU would be able to provide for 
a limited transition period of association for the region before finally deciding on membership. The 
Faroes precedent is indeed interesting and relevant for the Ålandic discussion however two 
structural differences makes the cases noticeably dissimilar. First of these differences is economic, 
while the Fareo Islands were entirely dependent on fishing products for their economy, Åland has a 
service and communications-based economy which was integrated to its near environment. 
Secondly Åland was granted permanent derogations justified on the status it enjoys under 
international law. Both the Primer of Åland Erlandsson and the EU ambassador to Finland at the 
time, Eric Hayes claim that without this status Åland would probably have not received such 
derogations making the prospects of membership for Åland more complicated.420 It should be 
reminded that even with the granted derogations the Ålandic voters were not entirely convinced of 
 
419 Offentlighetsprincipen in Swedish. 
420 See Fagerlund 1997, pp.203-204 for the Fareose case and Hayes 2011 for the EU perspective on the derogations. 
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the benefits of the EU and the yes majority was very slim and only 2 out of the 16 municipal 
districts had a yes majority. 
6.3 Discourses on the Sweden-Åland-Finland Axis 
 
Since the foundation of the Åland movement, the conceptualisations of both Sweden and Finland 
have played a crucial role in the political history of Åland. In fact, Wrede states that the main 
political cleavage on Åland, that between the “the legality line” and the “the pragmatic line” rests 
on this axis.421This played out during the EU debates during the discussion of what was labelled by 
the Premier and certain parties422 as “threshold questions”, namely the demand for a separate MEP 
for Åland and a promise for expanded taxation authority. These questions are separated from the 
discourses on the EU as such on the basis that they had no direct relation to the EU as such but 
rather provides indications of the political actors’ place on main cleavage of Åland’s politics.  
The very label of “threshold questions” brings the implication that left unsatisfied, Åland would 
threaten Finland with the scenario of having to deal with a part of its territory remaining outside the 
European Union. This would potentially mean elongated negotiations with unpredictable results 
both with the representatives of Åland and with the European Union. Whether or not the uncertainty 
regarding the “outside track” could have been dealt with in a less uncertain way is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the difference between EU membership and this 
scenario was roughly 500 votes.423  
It appears that the with this posturing the Regional Government was attempting to use the EU 
process it pursue its own political agenda to increase the representation of Åland at the European 
level and to increase its own powers in relation to Finland.  
With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the Regional Government had no actual short or long 
term plans on achieving these “threshold questions” as after 25 years of membership, Åland has 
neither its own MEP nor any increased taxation authority from the 1991 Autonomy Act. 
On the first of the “threshold questions” the MEP question drew very little controversy among the 
parties of the Regional Parliament. All the represented parties argued in favour of Åland receiving 
its own MEP. This seems to be justified on two main lines of overlapping modes of thought: the 
view which based its argument on the transfer of legislative power to the EU organs and on the 
 
421 See Wrede 1979 
422 The Centre Party, the FS and the Unaligned all stated that these were ”preconditions” for a EU membership. 
423 See section 4. 
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view based on a normative understanding of the Ålanders as a “separate people” in the EU. It is 
interesting that the latter approach was mainly expressed by Liberal MPs, a party that is otherwise 
considered to be a part of the “pragmatic line” and holds close relations with the Swedish People’s 
Party. The MEP question brought out unity among the parties of Åland. The EU had decided that 
the allocation of MEPs would be decided on nationally meaning that the member states had the 
ultimate authority over the internal distribution of granted MEPs, which in Finland’s case in 1994 
was 16. There was unanimity on obtaining a MEP for Åland based on the symbolic importance of 
the autonomy arrangement in relation to the rest of the state. There was also the belief that a direct 
access to the legislative organ of the European Union would increase the paradiplomatic capabilities 
of the region. 
The taxation question on the other hand brought forward the classic division among the Ålandic 
party system.  those who take an aggressive approach towards the Finnish state by stating Finland’s 
“legal obligations” to expand Ålandic autonomy as much as possible and hold a romantic nationalist 
view of Sweden (i.e. the Legality Line). The parties belonging to this tradition are the Centre Party 
and the Unaligned. While the FS were grouped with the pragmatic line by Wrede424, their rhetoric 
was closer to this bloc during the EU process. This said its noteworthy that they did admit that they 
were in favour of EU membership already in the first debate on 14 September. They were all in 
favour of expanded taxation powers and in varying degrees accused Finland of not respecting the 
1921 settlement. Some MP’s along this line of reasoning expressed emotional and ideological 
concern about establishing a tax border towards Sweden as a result of the tax exemption. 
On the other side of this the cleavage, the “pragmatic line” which emphasizes the value of 
cooperation with Finland as the means to advancing Åland’s autonomy. These parties are the Social 
Democrats and the Liberals. They did not connect the EU process with the efforts to expand 
Åland’s authority against Finland and maintained that the parties of the “legality line” were playing 
a risky political game that would threaten Åland’s credibility with the state officials. They 
frequently questioned the mentioning of the expanding taxation authority within the EU debates and 
also questioned the benefits of increasing taxation authority for Åland as such.  
The main change of tone on these two questions came after the referendum results on 16 October 
1994. After the approval of EU membership by the Ålandic voters, it seems that the Regional 
Government implicitly acknowledged that regardless of the “threshold” they had previously set, 
they had no other choice than to guarantee membership. 
 
424 Wrede 1979, p.58 see Note 55. 
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After the referendum, the discussion shifted into the realisation of the tax exemption which was 
initially hindered by a proposal by the Finnish Parliament which integrated Åland into the Finnish 
tax zone. This was resolved a few years later and Åland became a third territory in relation to the 
EU on 1 July 1999. How this exemption was realised is a process worth analysis of its own. 
6.4 Methodological Reflections 
 
Using Waever’s layered framework it can be observed that identity played a significant role for the 
Ålandic EU debates. The idea that Ålanders constituted a separate political entity which strove 
towards protecting and developing its autonomy shows that the “autonomy ideology” of the post-
Sundblom leadership has taken root in the Ålandic party system. Both the Yes side and the No side 
framed their argument on the basis of improving or defending autonomy. Hence it can be said that 
on Level 1 “autonomy” and the “people.”, in the Ålandic political context have become intertwined 
and politicians operating from this point of departure seem to have accepted this constellation. The 
territorial basis of the autonomy and the civic tools of demarcation from the outside world through 
the tool of regional citizenship indicates a predominantly civic understanding of identity although 
an undercurrent of ethnic fear towards Finnish language and its potential presence on Åland appears 
to be evident. Another important element of this fusion is the consensus on the belief that Åland has 
moral authority to formulate its own foreign policy. The idea that Åland was demilitarised and 
neutralised and that this was connected to the autonomy arrangement was without any challenge on 
Åland and a notable factor on their positioning on Level 2, Europe. The understanding that EU 
membership promoted Autonomy and that the EU had recognized the Regional Government’s 
interpretation regarding demilitarisation was decisive in promoting an environment in which on 
resulted in a membership at Level 3, European Policy. Those who were against EU membership 
maintained the incompatibility with Europe and the autonomy arrangement simultaneously arguing 
that they had “the true will of the people” on their side. 
While this method showed to be quite fitting for a historical analysis of the EU referendum on 
Åland, it noteworthy that it functions well with a “frozen data set” such as parliamentary debates 
and newspaper articles. It takes the events within their historical context and theorises about the 
political and linguistic structures in which the discussions took place. The historical nature of the 
topic should not downplay the contingency of the actual political decision in 1994 through an 
implicit historical path dependency. Several factors could have played out differently such as the 
results of the referendum on 16 October or the results of the Swedish referendum on 13 November 
in which the political elite had little control over. The main use of this choosing this method was to 
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contextualise the historical processes on Åland which contributed into the final decision and not to 
imply that it was inevitable. 
7. Conclusion 
 
“The most revolutionary decision in the history of autonomy”425 relied on 500 votes. With those 
500 votes Åland became a member of the EU alongside Finland and Sweden on 1 January 1995. It 
should be acknowledged that both the EU and Finland made significant accommodations to ensure 
this decision. The Åland Protocol recognized the legal restrictions regarding the Regional 
Citizenship alongside recognizing the economic dependency on the tourism and service industries 
through the tax exemption. The last-minute addition of the statement “with consideration of the 
status the Åland islands enjoy under international law” should also not be understated. Without this 
deliberately vaguely worded statement, it is likely that the political process to accept membership 
would have been much more difficult. This very statement allowed the Åland Government to claim 
that their understanding of the “international status” of Åland about the trinity of Åland’s 
constitutional status, its autonomy and its demilitarised and neutralised status had been recognized 
by the EU. This however was not the position of the Finnish Government who only accepted a 
reference to the autonomy arrangement, nor of the EU which was seeking after a justification for 
the derogations from the basic principles of the union.426 
One striking feature of this process has been the difference in enthusiasm between the political elite 
and the Ålandic voter. This is not to claim that the political establishment represented in the 
Regional Parliament was uniformly enthusiastic about the EU but rather to highlight that viewing 
the process backwards from the decision on 2 December (26-4 in favour of membership) and the 
referendum results on 20 November (73.6 percent in favour) would give a skewed impression 
regarding political attitudes towards the Union at the time. If the first referendum had resulted in a 
No result, it was almost certain that neither of these events would have taken place as they have. 
7.1 The Referendum Process and Historical Cleavages 
 
In the regional context it was clear from the beginning that Åland’s decision would be dependent on 
the decisions of Finland and Sweden due to the intimate connections of the region to these two 
 
425 Quote by Harry Jansson in Ålandstidningen 15 November 1994. 
426 See Hayes 2017 for an EU perspective on this statement. 
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countries economically, politically, and culturally. This created two sub processes during this 
process: one before the vote on 16 October and one after. 
The process before the first vote on 16 October can be characterised as period of uncertainty in 
which the MPs insisted on several demands regardless of the probability of actualising them. This 
caused a significant amount of debate on increased taxation authority despite no clear signals from 
the Finnish Government and Parliament that it would even be considered during this process. 
The process after the vote on 16 October was noticeably restricted to the terms of how Åland would 
join the Union and the realisation of the tax exemption was put forward as main point of concern. 
This was noted by the Social Democrats who had from the beginning claimed that a second 
referendum was not necessary as Åland’s membership also depended on the results of the vote in 
Finland. 
The historical developments of Åland played itself on two fronts: The Urban-Rural divide and the 
autonomy politics cleavage between the “pragmatic line” and the “legality line”.  
On the urban-rural divide the Unaligned Coalition and the Centre Party had the most EU sceptic 
positions based on concern for the wellbeing of rural communities and the centralisation of power 
towards Brussels. The Unaligned Coalition refused to the change its position and maintained its 
opposition to membership until the very end based on sovereigntist arguments. The Centre Party 
took a more compromising approach which took into consideration the EU as a new avenue to 
advocate Åland’s interests, the choices of Finland and Sweden on EU membership and the 
uncertainty of a non-membership scenario. The Liberals with a split voter base maintained an 
ideological positivity towards the prospect of EU membership but also felt the need to acknowledge 
that it would also have some disadvantages for Åland due to the Common Agricultural and 
Fisheries Policy of the EU. The FS as a mainly urban party was positive to the EU on economical 
and ideological grounds. However, it was the only party to not be able to achieve party discipline on 
the final vote due to Harry Eriksson, an MP from the archipelago stating his worries about 
urbanisation and centralisation of power. The Social Democrat MPs all were in favour of 
membership on grounds of ideological positivity towards international cooperation and economic 
advantages of participation in the Common Market. They did not express much concern regarding 
agricultural policy or urbanisation. The results of the first referendum strongly indicate a rural 
scepticism toward the EU on Åland. The lack of total party discipline on the conservative FS shows 
that the importance of the urban rural divide and personal politics have also played a role in the 
referendum process. 
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On the divide between the “legality line” and the “pragmatic line” rhetorically the Unaligned 
Coalition, the Centre Party and the conservative FS maintained a fairly aggressive tone towards 
Finland’s “legal obligation” to expand Åland’s autonomy as much as possible until the referendum 
on 16 October. The Unaligned was negative throughout the entire process while the Centre Party 
only took a position in favour of membership until the results of the second referendum on 20 
November were clear. The FS maintained an EU-positive majority from the beginning of the 
referendum process in August 1994 but could not convince Harry Eriksson who voted with the 
Unaligned in the final vote. The Centre Party and FS insisted that a separate MEP and increased 
taxation authority for Åland were “basic preconditions” for a positive attitude towards membership 
in the EU but back down in response to the developments in Sweden and Finland and the prospect 
of uncertainty in a non-membership scenario. The “pragmatic line” was represented by the Social 
Democrats and the Liberals. They insisted that the taxation issue had no direct connection with the 
EU process and also questioned the benefits calling the MEP and taxation issues “threshold 
questions”. An interesting effect of the EU process has been the aggressive rhetoric on the 
conservative FS who have otherwise been grouped together with the Liberals and Social Democrats.   
One topic that united a majority (except the No voters) of the MP’s was that the EU provided a new 
forum for Åland’s external relations, a recognition and strengthening of the international status of 
Åland and recognition of the economic sensitivities of Åland through the tax exemption. 
It can be said that the EU has constituted a “cross cutting” cleavage in the sense that neither the 
“pragmatic vs legality line” cleavage nor the urban-rural cleavage could maintain its traditional 
groupings. Especially the conservative FS and its renegade MP Harry Eriksson is case in point. 
Perhaps the most important exception of these was that the Centre Party ended up voting in favour 
of membership despite the lack of support in rural regions in the first referendum and despite 
otherwise holding an aggressive tone towards Finland. The EU appears to have been an issue that 
caused stress in the traditional front lines of Ålandic politics. 
7.2 Avenues for Further Research 
 
Due to the elite driven design of this research project and the conduct of Political History in general, 
the focus has been on publicly available documents left behind from elected officials of the time. 
The discrepancy between the elected officials and the electorate was evident and this could provide 
Åland more presence in research on Nordic voter attitudes towards the EU. 
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An interesting research project would be to interview the MPs that took the decision to join the EU, 
at least the ones that are still among us and compare their responses to analyse if their 
understandings of the EU have changes over the decades of experience within the EU. This would 
help understand further conceptual and perceptual changes regarding the discourse on the EU on 
Åland after membership. 
Regarding the “threshold questions” set by the Regional Government never came to fruition but the 
demand of a separate MEP was still added to the final declaration of the Regional Parliament’s 
consent to membership in the EU. It would be worthwhile to analyse if and how the successive 
Regional Governments have conceptualized the idea of a MEP for Åland and how they have acted 
on the topic after 1994. 
It would also be interesting to see if the EU membership has affected the party system on Åland in 
any significant way and how the parties have reacted to EU membership in the long term. 
7.3 Final Remarks 
 
Returning to the two quotes at the beginning of the thesis, the discussion to join the EU was both 
the “most revolutionary decision” in the history of  autonomy and evidence that politics of Åland 
could no longer be restricted to only internal Åland affairs. The interdependence of Åland to the 
broader international environment manifested itself in two dimensions: the need to react to the 
European Integration process and the need to react to the decisions of its neighbourhood (i.e. 
Finland and Sweden) on the European Integration. Considering the stated goal of the Regional 
Government as “membership with derogations” in the beginning of the process, the result can be 
considered a success. However, the demand of “threshold questions”, neither of which were 
demanded by the Åland Government during the negotiations with the EU during 1992-1994, had a 
different fate.  
The decision to transfer a share of the Åland’s legislative authority to a supranational organisation, 
the European Union, remains the only occurrence where the Regional Parliament has willing 
decreased its own right to decide in favour of EU membership with derogations. This study aimed 
to the put this decision in its historical context with consideration to the longer political history of 
the Åland Islands. The consequences of this decision remain relevant 25 years after the fact and is 
likely to maintain its relevance so long as the Åland Islands remain a part of the EU. 
 
91 
 
8. Bibliography 
8.1 Primary Sources 
8.1.1 Parlimentary Debates 
Ålands Lagting (14 September 1994), Stenografiska Protokoll, Avslutningssessionen   
5.9.1994-26.1994. Archived in: Lagtingsbibloteket, Mariehamn 
Ålands Lagting (21 September 1994), Stenografiska Protokoll, Avslutningssessionen   
5.9.1994-26.1994. Archived in: Lagtingsbibloteket, Mariehamn 
Ålands Lagting (26 September 1994), Stenografiska Protokoll, Avslutningssessionen   
5.9.1994-26.1994. Archived in: Lagtingsbibloteket, Mariehamn 
Ålands Lagting (11 November 1994), Stenografiska Protokoll, Höstsessionen:   1.11.1994-
20.1.1995, Band I: 1.11.1994-21.12.1994. Archived in: Lagtingsbibloteket, Mariehamn 
Ålands Lagting (17 November 1994), Stenografiska Protokoll, Höstsessionen:   1.11.1994-
20.1.1995, Band I: 1.11.1994-21.12.1994. Archived in: Lagtingsbibloteket, Mariehamn 
Ålands Lagting (28 November 1994), Stenografiska Protokoll, Höstsessionen:   1.11.1994-
20.1.1995, Band I: 1.11.1994-21.12.1994. Archived in: Lagtingsbibloteket, Mariehamn. 
8.1.2 Ålandstidningen  
Retrieved from: National Library of Finland Microfilm Archive, Helsinki. 
16 June 1994. 
19 August 1994. 
25 August 1994. 
7 September 1994. 
9 September 1994. 
14 September 1994. 
17 September 1994. 
28 September 1994. 
30 September 1994. 
17 October 1994. 
21 October 1994. 
25 October 1994. 
26 October 1994. 
27 October 1994 
28 October 1994. 
1 November 1994. 
92 
 
8 November 1994. 
15 November 1994. 
21 November 1994. 
2 December 1994. 
 
8.1.3 Nya Åland 
Retrieved from: National Library of Finland Microfilm Archive, Helsinki 
19 August 1994. 
10 September 1994. 
27 September 1994. 
4 October 1994. 
8 October 1994. 
14 October 1994. 
10 November 1994. 
14 November 1994. 
15 November 1994. 
 
8.2 Legal Documents 
Convention on the Demilitarisation of the Åland Islands, 30 March 1856. Retrieved from: 
https://www.lagtinget.ax/sites/www.lagtinget.ax/files/internationella_avtal_1856-1992.pdf  
The League of Nations Covenant, 1919. Retrieved from: 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp 
Decision on the Åland Islands of the Council of the League of Nations. “The Åland Decision”. 24 
June 1921. Retrieved from: 
https://www.lagtinget.ax/sites/www.lagtinget.ax/files/internationella_avtal_1856-1992.pdf 
The Åland Agreement in the Council of the League of Nations, 27 June 1921. Retrieved from: 
https://www.lagtinget.ax/sites/www.lagtinget.ax/files/internationella_avtal_1856-1992.pdf 
Convention on the non-fortificaton and neutralisation of the Åland Islands, 20 October 1921. 
Retrieved from: https://www.lagtinget.ax/sites/www.lagtinget.ax/files/internationella_avtal_1856-
1992.pdf 
The Autonomy Act of Åland, 1951. Retrieved from: 
https://www.regeringen.ax/sites/www.regeringen.ax/files/attachments/law/afs1952-
nr5.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1Mkqsb9tMHGNoK5rYu3MqdKd_kNd6WUaHZ_vE8qda97dgpeKhWn8VmPqk 
The Autonomy Act of Åland, 1991. Retrieved from: 
https://www.finlex.fi/sv/laki/kaannokset/1991/en19911144.pdf 
93 
 
 
8.3 Books and Articles 
Ackrén, M. and Lindström, B. (2012) Autonomy development, irredentism and secessionism in a 
Nordic context, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 494–511 
Ackren, M. (2014) Greenlandic Paradiplomatic Relations in Heininen, L. (Ed.) Security and 
Sovereignty in the North Atlantic (pp. 42-61) UK: Palgrave Macmillian  
Ackrén, M. (2018) Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy in the North Atlantic and the Arctic – A 
Comparative Approach in Matthias Finger and Lassi Heininen (eds.) The Global Arctic Handbook. 
(pp. 235-249). US:Springer International Publishing. 
Aguirre, I. (1999) Making Sense of Paradiplomacy: An Intertextual Inquiry about a Concept in 
Search of a Definition in Aldecoa, F. & Keating, M. (eds.) Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign 
Relations of Subnational Governments London: Frank Cass. 
Frog, E., Ahola, J., & Lucenius, J. (2014) (Eds.) The Viking Age in Åland: Insights into Identity and 
Remnants of Culture. Sastamala: Academia Scientiarum Fennica. 
Austin, J.L. (1962) How To Do Things With Words Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Barros, J. (1968) The Åland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations New York: 
Yale University Press. 
Bartmann, B. (2006) In or out: Sub-national island jurisdictions and the antechamber of para-
diplomacy. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 95(386) pp. 541-
559. 
Benedikter, T. (2009) The World's Modern Autonomy Systems. Concepts and Experiences of 
Regional Territorial Autonomy. Bolzano/Bozen: EURAC Research. 
Björkholm, M. & Rosas, A. (1990) Ålandsöarnas demilitarisering och neutralisering Åbo: Åbo 
Academy Press. 
Brown, C. and Ainsley, K. (2005) Understanding International Relations China: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Carr, E. H. (1939/2001) The Twenty Years Crisis Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cornago, N. (2010) On the Normalization of Sub-State Diplomacy The Hague Journal of 
Diplomacy 5(1-2) p. 11-36.  
De Geer-Hancock, Y, (1986) Åländskhet:Nationsbygget på “Fredens Öar”. Mariehamn: 
Ålandstidningens Tryckeri. 
Duchacek I. (1984) The International Dimension of Subnational Self- Government Publius 
14(4), pp.5-31 
Duchacek I. (1990/2001) Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of a New Actors in 
International Relations in by Michelmann H. and Soldatos P. (Eds.) Federalism and International 
Relations: The Role of Subnational Units, (pp. 1-33) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Drejer, M. (1947) Ålands Självstrelse 25 År Mariehamn: Ålands Tidnings Tryckeri. 
94 
 
Ekman, M. (2006) The Right to be Small and Different: On Self-Governing Åland and the EU 
Mariehamn, Åland: The Åland Islands Peace Institute. 
Eriksson, L. & Kangas, U. (1988) Ålandsfrågan Helsingfors: Juristförbundets Förlag. 
Eriksson, T. (1965) Åland: An Autonomous Province Mariehamn: Ålands Tidnings-Tryckeri Ab 
Fagerlund, N. (1997). The Special Status of the Åland Islands in the European Union In L. 
Hannikainen, & F. Horn (Eds), Autonomy and Demilitarisation in International Law: The Åland 
Islands in a Changing Europe (pp. 189-256). The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. 
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (2001). Taking stock: The constructivist research program in 
international relations and comparative politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 4, pp. 391-416. 
Finnemore, M. (1996). National Interests in International Society Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press. 
Gagnon, A., & Keating, M. (2012) Political Autonomy and Divided Societies: Imagining 
Democratic Alternatives in Complex Settings. United States: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hannikainen, L. (1993) Cultural, Linguistic and Educational Rights in the Åland Islands: An 
Analysis in International Law. Helsinki: Publications of the Advisory Board for International 
Human Rights Affairs No.5. 
Hannikainen, L. & Horn, F. (1997) (Eds.) Autonomy and Demilitarisation in International Law: the 
Åland Islands in a Changing Europe. The Hague: Kluwer Law international. 
Hannus, M. (2012) Ett fredsinstitut på Åland. Processer, motiv och argument 1981-1992 Rapport 
Från Ålands Fredsinstitut. No.2-2012 Accessed from: 
http://www.peace.ax/images/stories/pdf/Rapport_2-2012_webb.pdf 
Hansen, L. & Waever, O. (Eds.) (2002) European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge 
of the Nordic States. New York: Routledge. 
Hayes, E. (2011). Aland Aspirations - and EU Anxieties, in From Cold War to Common Currency: 
a personal perspective on Finland and the EU. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs - 
Foreign Policy Papers No. 1. (pp.57-65)  
Hepburn, E. (2014) Forging Autonomy in a Unitary State: The Åland Islands in Finland 
Comparative European Politics 12(4-5) pp. 468-487. 
Holmen, J. (2015) Åland—navigating between possible identities, 1852–2012 in Edquist, S. and 
Holmen, J. (eds.) Islands of Identity: History-writing and identity formation in five island regions in 
the Baltic Sea.(pp. 143-242) Huddinge: Södertörn University.  
Howarth, D. & Torfing, J. (2005) (Eds.) Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy 
and Governance Great Britain: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Jahn, D. & Storsved, A.S. (1995) Legitimacy through referendum? The nearly successful domino‐
strategy of the Eu‐referendums in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway,West European Politics, 
18 (4), pp. 18-37, DOI: 10.1080/01402389508425105 
95 
 
Jansson, I. (2018). Minoriteterna i minoriteten: Om nationalism, migration och 
modersmålsundervisning på Åland. In Arvidsson, M., Arvidsson, L. H. & Arvidsson, L. S. (Eds.) 
Mänskliga rättigheter i samhället (pp. 103-125). Bokbox förlag. 
Jeffrey, C. & Wilcott, D. (2010) The Challenges of Territorial Politics: Beyond Methodological 
Nationalism in Hays C. (Ed.) New Directions in Political Science: Responding to the Challenges of 
an Interdependent world (pp. 167-188). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Joenniemi, P (2003) The Åland Islands issue. In Archer, C, Joenniemi, P (eds) The Nordic Peace. 
(pp. 88–104). Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Joenniemi, P. (2014). The Åland Islands: Neither local nor fully sovereign. Cooperation and 
Conflict, 49(1) pp. 80–97. 
Jääskinen, N. (2005) The Case of the Åland Islands: Regional Autonomy versus the European 
Union of States in Stephen Weatherill and Ulf Bernitz (eds.), The Role of Regions and Sub National 
Actors in Europe: Essays in European Law (pp. 89–101.) Oxford: Hart Publishing,  
Keating, M. (1998) The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and 
Political Change Cheltenham & Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Keating, M. (1999) Regions and International Affairs: Motives, Opportunities and Strategies in 
Aldecoa, F. & Keating M. (Eds.) Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Affairs of Subnational 
Governments (pp. 1-16) Great Britain & United States: Frank Cass Publishers. 
Keating, M. & McGarry, J. (2001) (Eds.) Minority Nationalism and Changing International Order 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Keating, M. & McGarry, J. (2006) (Eds.) European Integration and the Nationalities Question. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Keating, M. (2013) Rescaling the European State: The Making of Territory and the Rise of the 
Meso Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kimlycka, W. (2001) Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kuznetsov, A. S. (2014) Theory and Practice of Paradiplomacy: Subnational Governments in 
International Affairs London and New York: Routledge. 
League of Nations (1921) The Aaland Islands Question: Raport Submitted to the Council of the 
League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs Geneva: Council Document: B7 21/68/106. 
Lee, M. (Ed.) (1996) The European Union and the Nordic Countries London: Routledge 
Lindh, K, (1984) Det åländska samhället Esbo: Ab Svenska Läromedel. 
Mattsson-Eklund, B. (2000) Alla tiders Åland: Från Istid till EU-inträde. Mariehamn: Ålands 
landskapsregering. 
Meinander, H. (2016) Nationalstaten: Finlands svenskhet 1922-2015 Helsingfors: Svenska 
litteratursällskapet i Finland. 
96 
 
Michelmann, H. L. (2009) Federalism and Foreign Relations Ottawa: McGill-Queens University 
Press.  
Moravcsik, A. (1997) Taking Preferences Seriously: The Liberal Theory of International Politics 
International Organization (51) 513–53. 
Morin, J-F., & Paquin, J. (2018) Foreign Policy Analysis: A Toolbox Switzerland: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Morgenthau, H. J. (1948/1978) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace New 
York: Alfred P. Knopf. 
Neumann, I. B. (2002). Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy. 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 31(3), pp. 627–651. 
Olesen, T. B. & Strang, J. (2015) European challenge to Nordic institutional cooperation: Past, 
present and future in Strang, (Ed.) Nordic Cooperation: A Region in Transition (pp.27-48) London: 
Routledge. 
Onuf, N. (1989) World of Our Making Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
Öst, H. (2011). The Cultural and Linguistic Safeguards of the Åland Minority Protection. i S. 
Spiliopoulou Åkermark (Ed), The Åland Example and Its Components. Relevance for International 
Conflict Resolution.(pp.72-85) Mariehamn: The Åland Islands Peace Institute. 
Özkirimli, U. (2000/2010) Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Padelford, N. J., & Andersson, K. G. A. (1939). The Aaland Islands Question. American Journal of 
International Law, 33, pp. 465-487. 
Palonen, K. (2003). Four Times of Politics: Policy, Polity, Politicking, and 
Politicization. Alternatives, 28(2), pp. 171–186. 
Robins, G. (2004) Bomarsund: Outpost of Empire Mariehamn: Mariehamns Tryckeri. 
Salminen, J. (1979) Ålandskungen Mariehamn: Ålandstidnings Tryckeri 
Scarpulla, C. (2002) The Constitutional Framework for the Autonomy of Åland: A Survey of the 
Status of an Autonomous Region in the throes of European Integration Mariehamn: Meddelanden 
från Ålands högskola nr 14. 
Searle, J. (1969/2011) Speech Acts: An Essay on the Philosophy of Language New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
SIFO Futures AB (1992) Åland i Europa- En Omvärldsanalys Stockholm: Åländsk 
Utredningsserie. 
Silverström, S. (2002) Åland i Europeiska unionen Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
Finland. 
Silverstörm, S. (2013) Åland in the EU, Jyväskylä: Europe Information, Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs of Finland. 
97 
 
Soldatos, P. & Michelmann, H.J. (1992) Subnational units’ paradiplomacy in the context of 
European integration Journal of European Integration 15(2-3), pp. 129-134. 
Spiliopoulou Åkermark, S. (Ed). (2007). Den åländska hembygdsrätten Rapport från seminariet 
Hembygdsrätt, näringsrätt, medborgarrätt – hörnstenar i den åländska självstyrelsen i Helsingfors 
den 14 juni 2007 Estland: Ålands fredsinstitut och Ålands Lanskapsregering. 
Spiliopoulou Åkermark, S. (Ed). (2011). The Åland Example and Its Components - Relevance for 
International Conflict Resolution. Mariehamn, Åland, Finland: Ålands fredsinstitut. 
Spiliopoulou Åkermark, S. Heinikoski, S. and Kleemola-Juntunen (Eds.) (2018). Demilitarisation 
and International Law in Context: The Åland Islands. New York and London: Routledge. 
Söderlund, P. (2008) Partisystemets utveckling på Åland, Politiikka, 50(2), pp. 128–138. 
Suksi, M. (2005) Ålands Konsitution Turku: Åbo Academi University Press 
Suksi, M. (2011) Sub-State Governance through Territorial Autonomy: A Comparative Study in 
Constitutional Law of Powers, Procedures and Institutions Berlin:Springer. 
Sundback, B. (2006) A Success Story in Eriksson, S., Johansson, L., & Sundback, B. (eds), Islands 
of Peace – Åland’s autonomy demilitarisation and neutralisation. (pp. 77-126). Mariehamn, Åland, 
Finland: The Åland Islands Peace Institute.  
Sundberg, J. (1985) Svenskhetens dilemma i Finland. Finlandssvenskarnas samling och splittring 
under 1900-talet, Helsingfors: Finska Vetenskaps-Societeten. 
Sundberg, J. (2012) Asymmetric Federalism in a Unitary State: Autonomous Åland and Finland in 
Anckar, D. and Anckar C. (Eds.) Comparisons, Regimes, Elections: Festschift for Lauri Karvonen 
(pp.203-220) Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press. 
Stephan, S. (2014) Making Autonomies Matter: Sub-State Actor Accommodation in the Nordic 
Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers. European Diversity and Autonomy Papers (EDAP), 3. 
Stephan, S. (2017) Greenland, the Faroes and Åland in Nordic and European Co-operation: Two 
Approaches towards Accommodating Autonomies in International Journal on Minority and Group 
Rights 24(3) pp. 273-301. 
Strang, J. (ed.) (2015) Nordic Cooperation: A Region in Transition London: Routledge. 
Svensson, H. (1997) Åland Från Insidan Helsinki:Ålands Lagting. 
Tiilikainen, T, (2002) The Åland Islands, Finland and European Security Mariehamn, Åland, 
Finland: The Åland Islands Peace Institute. 
Tuder, E. (1993) Det Åländska Folkets Historia: 1920-1990. Ekenäs: Ekenäs Tyckeri Aktiebolag. 
Waever, O. (2002) Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy 
Theory in Hansen, L. & Waever, O. (Eds.) European Integration and National Identity: The 
Challenge of the Nordic States. (pp. 20-49) New York: Routledge 
Wendt, A. (1992) Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics 
International Organization (46) pp. 391–426. 
Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
98 
 
Wiesner, C, Palonen, K. & Haapala, T. (2017) Rhetoric, Politics and Society UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Wimmer, A. & Schiller, N. (2002) Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation–state building, 
migration and the social sciences. Global Networks, 2 (4) pp. 301-334. doi:10.1111/1471-
0374.00043 
Wrede, C. (1981). Politisk deltagande på Åland. Åbo: Svenska Litteratursällskapets i Finland 
Nämnd för Samhällsforskning No: 39 
Wrede, M. (1976) Partibildning och politik på Åland. Åbo: Svenska Litteratursällskapets i Finland 
Nämnd för Samhällsforskning No: 25 
Wrede, M. (1979) Om förutsättningarna för politisk fraktionsbildning på Åland in Anckar D. (Ed.) 
Förandring och Politik på Åland (pp. 31-60) Åbo: Publications of the Research Insitutute of the 
Åbo Akademi Foundation. 
Wrede, M, & Wrede, C. (1982) Landstinget som arena för den åländska politiken: partibildningen 
och valdeltagande. In  Åland i utveckling: Festskrift utgiven av Ålands landsting med anledning av 
självstyrelsens 60-årsjubileum den 9 juni 1982 (pp. 128-149) Mariehamn: Ålands landsting. 
Ålands Socialdemokraterna (2006) Socialdemokratin på Åland 100 År: Rättvisare och bättre 
Mariehamn: Ålandstryckeriet. 
Ålands statistik- och utredningsbyrå/ÅSUB (1994)  Folkomröstningarna om Anslutning till 
Europeiska Union: Statistik med Kommentarer  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
